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Abstract 
In the first part of the thesis, we study two methods of synchronizing and de-
tecting multi-carrier CDMA (MC-CDMA) signals. The first method uses the 
Fourier transform and a curve-fitting algorithm. This approach exploits the lin-
earity between time shift and carrier phase shifts of MC-CDMA signals with 
equally spaced carriers. The second method is based on the matched filter. The 
peak values of the autocorrelation of the signal are detected to estimate the 
transmitted signal. The received waveform is first sampled and quantized. A 
fixed sampling clock can be used. No feedback mechanism, such as a PLL, is 
used to adjust the sample timing in either method. Moreover, we use Shapiro-
Rudin sequence as the signature sequence to reduce the signal's peak-power-to-
average-power ratio. We analyze the performances of these simple methods for 
MC-CDMA signals in an additive white Gaussian channel. 
In the second part of the thesis, we study some security aspects in Inter-
net and Internet commerce systems. First we start with a brief introduction 
of mathematical theories behind the security systems. Then some well known 
private and public key cryptographic algorithms are presented. Some security 
softwares which employ these algorithms are also discussed. Using these security 
iv 
softwares and algorithms, we can establish infrastructures of some Internet com-
merce systems. The structures include some popular Internet browsers, different 
electronic payment methods like credit card, electronic cash and cheque, and 
different commercial payment systems including CyberCash, DigiCash, Mondex 
and so on. 
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Spread Spectrum Code Division Multiple Access (SS-CDMA) has shown 
to be a good candidate for modern broadband mobile communications. It has 
good immunity to noise and fading, and reasonable privacy and security. Com-
mon forms of SS-CDMA include (Direct Sequence) D S / S S - C D M A , (Frequency 
Hopping) F H / S S - C D M A and (TimeHopping) T H / S S - C D M A . TH/SS-CDMA 
is mainly for military use whereas DS/SS-CDMA and FH/SS-CDMA are com-
monly used for commercial purposes. 
An alternative broadband CDMA technique is the Multi-carrier C D M A 
(MC-CDMA) system. It uses the idea of Orthogonal Frequency Division 
Modulation (OFDM) with CDMA [2, 3, 4]. Multi-carrier systems have poten-
tial advantages over single-carrier system [6, 7]. An interesting duality exists 
between DS-CDMA and MC-CDMA [2, 3]. For SS-CDMA, the spreading se-
quence is applied to the signal in time. On the contrary, MC-CDMA system 
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multiplies the signature sequence to different carriers in frequency. 
Like other multi-carrier systems, MC-CDMA also has the problem of large 
peak-power-to-average-power ratio. To solve it, a binary sequence called the 
Shapiro-Rudin sequence can be used as the signature sequence [14 . 
In digital communications, synchronization of carrier phase and frequency 
is very important. Conventional methods use feedback mechanism, such as the 
Phase Locked Loop (PLL), to perform acquisition and tracking of the carrier 
phase and frequency. In a multi-carrier system, using multiple PLLs for the 
multiple carriers is expensive. Therefore, we study two other approachs which 
do not require the PLL [16 . 
The first approach exploits the linearity between the time shift and carrier 
phase shifts of MC-CDMA signals with equally spaced carriers. The F F T is 
performed to extract the carrier coefficients. Then the despreading operation is 
performed on these coefficients, followed by a curve-fitting algorithm to estimate 
the signal's time shift. The resulting vector of coefficients is used to detect the 
signal. The second approach is based on matched filter. It evaluates the auto-
correlation of the MC-CDMA signal. Peak values at the appropriate moments 
are used to estimate the transmitted signal. In either case, no feedback mecha-
nism is used to adjust the sample liming. A fixed sampling clock can be used, 
thus simplifying the circuitry. 
3 
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1.1 Spread Spectrum CDMA 
In some common multiple access methods like Time Division Multiple Access 
(TDMA) and Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA), there exist problems 
of multipath fading and interference, many researches have already shown that 
Spread Spectrum CDMA (SS-CDMA) is a good alternative to them [8:. 
The main features of SS-CDMA includes [8, 9]: 
1. Good immunity of jamming and interference. 
2. As spread spectrum means that the signal will occupy a wide bandwidth 
and introduce a frequency diversity, hence SS-CDMA can achieve a good 
performance in multipath fading channel due to multiple scatterers with 
different delays (delay spread). 
3. Each user has a signature code (PN sequence), it enables privacy and 
security. 
4. Universal frequency reuse - in TDMA and FDMA, the assigned fre-
quencies in neighboring cells is different to reduce co-channel interference. 
In SS-CDMA, the allocated spectrum can be used simultaneously by users 
in every cells which also means that the frequency reuse factor is 1 and 
frequency planning is much simple. 
5. Soft handoff- applying the RAKE receiver and the frequency reuse prop-
erty, a mobile station is able to receive the same signal from two adjacent 
base stations. A new connection can make before the old connection breaks 
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and it is called soft handofF. In this case, the probability of a call is dropped 
is reduced and better reception at cell's boundary can be achieved. 
Based on the features above, the cell capacity of SS-CDMA is higher. How-
ever, there are some difficulties that SS-CDMA system faces: (i) accurate power 
control to solve the "near-far" problem in reverse link and (ii) the timing of the 
pilot of DS/SS-CDMA signal for synchronization. 
1.1.1 Direct Sequence/SS-CDMA 
In (Direct Sequence) DS/SS-CDMA, a bit interval is divided into N chips with 
each chip of duration T�二 Tb/N. Suppose the information sequence a^ G 
{ — 1,1} , then each chip in an information bit will be multiplied by a pseudo-
random (PN) sequence c,- G { _ 1 , 1 } of length N. Since T � = Tb/N, so the signal 
spectrum is spread by a factor of N. The use of RAKE receiver can improve 
the performance by constructively combining multipath components with time 
delays greater than the signal correlation time [8 • 
1.1.2 Frequency Hopping/SS-CDMA 
In (Frequency Hopping) FH/SS-CDMA, like that in DS/SS-CDMA, the bit in-
terval is also divided into N chips of duration T^ = T^/N. In each bit interval, 
the signal is transmitted at different frequencies at different chips (the signal is 
hopped over different frequencies). The frequency synthesizer in the transmitter 
5 
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m Stages Shift Register 
> > 
• • • 
h~^ n~~^  ^~^ Output Sequence 
— ( ^ ( ^ ~ " " & © 
Figure 1.1: The Block Diagram of a m-sequence Generator 
will use the PN sequence to determine the frequency used for each chip. FH/SS-
CDMA has an advantage over DS/SS-CDMA that the frequency spectrum do 
not need to be contiguous. However, the frequency hopping pattern should be 
carefully selected to maintain orthogonality. 
1.1.3 Pseudo-noise Sequence 
One of the most commonly known binary (pseudo-noise/pseudo-random) PN 
sequences is the maximum-length shift register sequence (m-sequence) [10 . 
An m-sequence is a periodic sequence generated by an m-stage shift register as 
shown in Fig 1.1. The length and the period of an m-sequence is n = 2^ — 1 with 
2饥一1 ones and 2^_i — 1 zeros. The m-sequence bi G {0 ,1 } obtained is mapped 
into a binary sequence c,- G { — 1,1} before multiplying to the input signal. 
The autocorrelation of a PN sequence with period n is, 
m = E ( 2 6 . - 1)(2¾+, — 1) 0 < J < n — 1. 
Z = 1 
For ideal pseudo-random sequence, the autocorrelation function should be 
6 
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^(0) = n and ^{j) = 0 for 1 < j < n - 1. Using m-sequence, it has autocorrela-
tion function, • 
f 
n j 二 0 
<P{j)= < 
- 1 1 < i < n - 1. 
、 
However, the cross-correlation performance for m-sequence is not good enough 
for some CDMA applications. Some other PN sequences are proposed with bet-
ter cross-correlation characteristic. For example, the Gold sequences and Kasami 
sequences derived from certain m-sequences have a three-valued cross-correlation 
function [10]. 
1.2 Synchronization for CDMA signal 
1.2.1 Acquisition of PN Sequence 
For DS/SS-CDMA signal, the main synchronization problem is the synchro-
nization of the spreading and despreading PN sequences. This process mainly 
involves two stages [13], the PN acquisition stage and the PN tracking stage. 
Initailly, in the PN acquisiton stage, phase difference between the two sequences 
will be adjusted to within a certain small time offset. Then the two sequences 
will maintain synchronized in the PN tracking stage by a closed loop like Delay-
Locked Loop (DLL) or Tau-Dither Loop (TDL). 
7 
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Figure 1.2: The Block Diagram of a Phase Lock Loop 
1.2.2 Phase Locked Loop 
Phase Locked Loop (PLL) is a widely-used technique for acquisition and 
tracking of the carrier phase and frequency [11]. The basic structure of a PLL 
is consist of 3 main components, phase detector, the loop filter and voltage-
controlled oscillator (VCO) Fig.1.2. For a received signal r(t), the phase detec-
tor's output e{t) is a function of the phase difference between r(t) and the VCO 
output 冲 ) .T h e n e{t) will enter the loop filter to obtained the control signal 
c{t) for the VCO. 
Suppose the received signal is r{t) = cos(27r/ot + 0{t)) and the output of the 
VCO is v{t) = cos(27r/ot + ¢{1)) [10，12]. If the phase error is small such that 
the phase detector can operate in linear range, e{t) = 0{t) — ¢{1). The phase of 
the VCO output ¢{1) is depended on the control signal c(t), 
^{t) = I<v f c{r)dr, 
J — oo 
where Ky is the VCO gain constant. The loop filter is a low-pass filter which 
filter out the high frequency components in the phase error e{t) and it has a 
transfer function F{s). Applying Laplace transform to the equations above, the 
8 
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phase transfer function is [11], 
E{s) = e{s)-^s) 
¢(5) = K.-C{s) = ^^E{s)F{s) 
s s 
=-F{s){e{s)-^s)) 
^s) = K,F{s) 
兩 = s ^ K , F { s ) ' 
If a second order loop filter is used, the transfer function F{s) has the form, 
尸 ⑷ ： 器 （ / … ) . 
The phase transfer function is, 
n + K,sx 
Hs) 二 M i + / ( i d 
e (3 ) — ^,j^ (i^K,s\ 
� H i + i ^ i J 
= K,{i^K2s) 




In DS/SS-CDMA, the bit duration is divided into many chips and the spread-
ing/signature sequence is applied to each chip in time domain. The same idea 
can be applied in the frequency domain to a signal using OFDM (Orthogonal 
Frequency Division Modulation) or MCM (Multi-carrier Modulation). 
The entire frequency band is divided into many subbands and each subband has 
a carrier which is orthogonal to each other [1, 3]. In contrast to DS/SS-CDMA, 
the spreading sequence is multiplied to each carrier frequency. 
To construct a MC-CDMA signal with n carriers, the information sequence 
will enter an n-point inverse Discrete Fourier Transform (IDFT) block with the 
spreading/signature sequence multiplied to each carrier. Then the resulting 
sequence is LPF and the output continous waveform is transmited. At the 
receiver, the received signal will enter an n-point FFT block with the inverse 
of the spreading (despreading) sequence multiplied to each carrier as in the 
10 
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transmitter [5]. The use of IFFT and FFT shows the duality relation between 
DS/SS-CDMA and MC-CDMA. 
MC-CDMA can be considered as an alternative technique of current SS-
CDMA system. Comparing with FH/SS-CDMA, MC-CDMA does not require 
powerful synchronization and the receiver is less complex since frequency hop-
ping is not need. Also, MC-CDMA does not need channel estimation and equal-
ization as in DS/SS-CDMA [1]. Moreover, it is known that doppler spread is a 
dual of delay spread, and the RAKE receiver is used for DS/SS-CDMA in mul-
tipath channel with delay spread. This duality shows that the RAKE receiver 
can be used for MC-CDMA in multipath channel due to scattering on multiple 
moving objects (doppler spread) [3]. However, problems of MC-CDMA include 
the sensitivity of non-linearity in power amplifier and carrier synchronization 
5；. 
2.1 System Model 
An MC-CDMA transmitter is shown in Fig. 2.1. The information bit a^ G 
{ — 1,1} ( - o o < k < oo) is multiplied by the spreading sequence {c^} G { — 1,1} 
before entering a serial-to-parallel converter. The parallel output is multiplied 
to the carriers and then summed to constitute the following MC-CDMA signal 
(before up-conversion) 
oo 
S{t) = Y, CLkP[t - kTb), 
k--oo 
11 
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Figure 2.1: The Block Diagram of the Transmitter of an MC-CDMA System 
where 
p(t) = rect(yNfcnea2^fot, 
lb n=0 
rect{') is the rectangular function, N is the number of carriers, f�二 l/T*6 is the 
frequency spacing between adjacent carriers, and Th is the bit duration of the 
signal. 
2.2 Crest Factor 
A potential problem of MC-CDMA signals is the large ratio of peak power to 
average power. This ratio is often called the crest factor of the signal waveform 
s{t) [14. ^ 
叫 ⑴ } = & 
where || s{t)丨丨⑴ means the maximum magnitude of the signal s(t) and || s{t) ||2 
is the root-mean-square value of 5(t), 
I S{t) ||oo= sup |5(t)|, 
t 
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Figure 2.2: The Multi-carrier signal with 64 carriers and 7\ : 10/i5 (All one 
Sequence) 
and 1 
| | 参 { 去 / : 柳 广 
The maximum magnitude of s{t) is found depending on the choice of the sig-
nature sequence {c^}. Random or pseudo-random selections of the spreading 
sequence {c^} often results in large crest factors which may grow without bound 
as N (the number of carriers) increases. A normalised multicarrier signal us-
ing all one sequence and random sequence is shown in Fig. 2.2 and Fig. 2.3 
respectively, the crest factor is the maximum amplitude of the signal. However, 
if {cn} is selected from certain classes of sequences, such as the Shapiro-Rudin 
sequences or the Golay complementary sequences, then the crest factor (mea-
sured in the baseband) is no more than 2 (or 6 dB), for any value of N [14. 
A normalised multicarrier signal using Shapiro-Rudin sequence is shown in Fig. 
2.4. 
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2.3 Shapiro-Rudin Sequence 
From Golay's definition, a set of binary complementary sequences is defined as 
a pair of equally long, finite sequences of two elements [15]. The number of 
pairs of equal elements with any given separation in one sequence is equal to 
the number of pairs of unequal elements with the same separation in the other 
sequence. 
This basic property can be represented by the characteristic that the sum 
of autocorrelations of the two sequences is zero except at zero shift. For two 
complementary sequences A and B with length n and elements {-1,1} , they have 
autocorrelation functions given by, 
n n 
M ) 二 XI ai^i+j and <fc(j) = Y1 kk+j 
i=i i=i 
0 < j < n - 1 
where, 
2n j = 0 
Mj) + Mj)= < 
0 1 < j < n - 1. 
^ 
3 I , 1 . ！ 1 ! 1 ！ ！ 
^ • 1 V ； i| • I 
" _ _ A _ A _ _ 
—1 1 -.. -' r 1  y I y I \ -
^ v^ i 丨 丨 I.....\J f.L.. .v.._ 
—2 — r \ r ； ： I ： 
—3� o 1 0.2 0_3 0.4 0_5 0.& 0.7 0.& O.Q 1 
t X 1 0_5 
Figure 2.3: The Multi-carrier signal with 64 carriers and Th 二 10^5 (Random 
Sequence) 
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Figure 2.4: The Multi-carrier signal with 64 carriers and Tb = 10/i5 (Shaprio-
Rudin Sequence) 
For binary complementary sequence, the number of elements must be even and a 
sum of at most two squares. If we construct two binary complementary sequences 
in which N is a power of 2, the resulting sequences are known as the Shapiro-
R u d i n sequences. Suppose we start from two Shapiro-Rudin sequences of 
length 4, 
A = { l - 1 - 1 - 1 } and B = { - 1 1 - 1 - 1}, 
we can construct others Shapiro-Rudin sequences with length 8 by appending 
the sequences A and B, and the sequences A and B' (complement of B), 
Ai = AB = {1 - 1 — 1 一 1 — 11 — 1 - 1} 
Bi 二 AB' 二 { 1 — 1 — 1 — 11 — 111}. 
Both sequences Ai and Bi are also complementary sequences. We can repeat this 




Synchronization and Detection 
by Line-Fitting 
3.1 Unmodulated Signals 
We consider the synchronization acquisition stage. Assume an unmodulated syn-




Assuming the signal suffers a time shift of r, the received waveform, after down-
conversion, is 
K 0 = 5 N ^ [ ^ 2 ^ / � ( t + T ) ] + n ( � ) . 
n=0 
The term n{t) encompasses noise and multiple-access interferences. We assume 
the transmit baseband signal s{t) is up-shifted to a higher carrier band fc for 
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transmission and then downshifted back to baseband at the front end of the 
receiver. We further assume that the receiver frequency down shifting requires 
no carrier phase synchronization, then carry phase shift of 0 in the received 
baseband signal r(t). Let the sample value of r{i) be (ro, n , •. •, Hv-i) with 
r F 5 ? C n e " [ � + 2 — � ( ^ + T ) ] + n & . 
n=0 
We model the noise term no,rzi,.. .,n7v-1 as i.i.d. Gaussian noise. This sim-
plifies our derivations. Further detailed studies may be needed to justify this 
assumption. We do not discuss them here. After Fourier transform and mul-
tiplying the resulting Fourier coefficients by { l / c ^ } , we obtain the coefficient 
vector ( ¾ , Ri , ." , RN-i ) where 
Rn = ^ T k e ； 
Cn" k=0 
1 N-1 /N-1 ^ \ , 
二 — E ( E 0 饥 6 形 + 2 — 套 + 厂”] + 似 r ^ ¥ 
CnN &=o Vm=0 / 
1 N-1 N-1 1 N-1 
二 ^ Z 。 饥 6 糾 2 應 / 0 丁 ] ^ e*&(7) + ^ ^ nke-]4 
CnN m=o 左=0 Cnl�k=0 
1 N-1 1 N-1 N-1 _ 
= _ i _ , ^ , . [ ^ + 2 x n / . . ] ^ ,0 + _ ^ ^ c ^ e " _ ^ / � T ] ^ e ] — � � � + e. 
CnN /j_o .CnJ^  m=o A;=0 
m^n 
1 N-1 fl _ ^j27v(m-n)' 
—j[0+27rnfoT] , i V r pJ.[^ 27rm/oT] ：：：_^  i g^  
— 十 c^N ^,肌 1 — e^M^)卞". 
in�Y 饥=0 匕丄 匕 」 
m^n 
Therefore, 
1 N-1 k 
Rn 二 e"[^2^/�T] + ^^  where e, 二 — J ] n f ce—^A 
Cnl� k=0 
See Figure 3.1. Let 小几 二 ^Rn. Typical values of {^n} are plotted in Figure 3.2 
(without 0 and e^). The graph is a line with slope 27rr, except discontinuities 
involving 2ir phase jumps. 
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{l/cnl 
r(t) ^ h — \ M — \ Phase 
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/ Compensation V ^ Ld__ 
Figure 3.1: The Block Diagram of the Phase Compensation Model 
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Figure 3.2: The Phase Spectrum without (left) and with AWGN (right) for 
T 二 0.391^5 
2TTnfoT (mod 27r) if 27rnfoT (mod 27r) < ir 
•n = S 
{27TnfoT (mod 27r)) — 2ir otherwise. 
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V ^ S ^ > 、 
i ^ < r 
X-' T ] ^ Phase jump from 
+ve to -ve 
Figure 3.3: Example of sudden Phase Jump due to Noise 
3.2 Estimating the Time Shift by Line-Fitting 
Based on the vector {¢0, 4>i-, ..., ^N-i) , the phase estimator obtains an approxi-
mation to the unknown time shift r and the carrier phase shift 0. 
From Fig. 3.2, we can see that the phase spectrum has slope 27rr except dis-
continuities involving 27r phase jumps. We compensate for these discontinuities 
by adding 2% after every jump from ir to - i r (or subtracting 2n after every jump 
from -7T to 7T). Let the resulting phases be denoted {<^n}. Then a line-fitting 
algorithm is used. The slope of the fitted line is r, an estimate of the time shift 
T . 
When noise is added, the jump may not be exactly 2iT. Therefore, in the 
simulation, we add 2% after every jump > -7r (or subtract 2ir after every jump 
> 7T). Moreover, consider the phase vector {^n} of the phase spectrum without 
noise. For those 4>i ^ ir (or —7r), small noise added may alter them to negative 
(positive) values, i.e. large phase jumps occur. In this case, the 2兀 compensation 
should not apply to these values. The difficulty to overcome this problem affects 
the performance of the line-fitting especially for large 丁 and small SNR. 
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We use the least-square-error algorithm to fit a line 小孔=^ + 2irnfoT. The 
square error is 
E' = Y.{^n-0-2^nfoT)\ 
n 
Solving for, 
dE^|d6 = - 2 ^ ( ( / ^ , - ^ - 2 7 T 7 2 / , f ) = 0 
n 
dE^dr = —4：7^Y^nfoy>r^ — 0 — 27^nfo干、二Q. 
n 
We obtain, 
< ‘2^f EnJo nfo + ON = E^^L"o <l>n 
<�27rr El_oi n'Po + ^ E^Jo' n f � = E^Jo' n U n -
We can simplify the summation in the equations above. 
¥ N{N-l) 
^ nJo = 5 Jo 
n=0 ^ 
¥ N{N-l){2N-l) 
2 ^ 几 fo 二 ^ Jo . 
n = 0 ^ 
Solving the system of equations above, we have 
~ — N S:—Qi nMn — E!L"o nfo S:"pi <Pn 
丁 — 2x[A^E=� ln2/�2-(EjL—� ln /� )2] 
_ Nfo Etc ) i nK - N{N - l ) / o / 2 E^=o' K 
-N\N - l){2N — l)7r/2/3 - N�N — l)MoV2 
6 [ ¥ , ( A ^ - l ) ^ \ J 
= 释 - l ) / . [ ( 4 7 V — 2) - 3(iV — 1)] L ^ "么 - ~ ^ h n 
0 r N-i N-i . 
二 mm i w f 2 E ^ < ^ n - ( i V - i ) E < ^ n ’ 
N[N2 — l)7Tfo L n=0 n=0 
,—El-p^ 4>n E=�1 n^fo — E = nfo E = nfM 
— N L t o ' n � � - ( X = n f � Y 
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{RJ fe � ‘ I ！ 了 
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Figure 3.4: The Block Diagram of the Phase Estimator 
12 \ N { N - \ ) { 2 N - l ) f l ^ ^ ^ 寧 - 1 ) 九 2 化 乂 “ 
二 零 _ 1)九2 [ 6 S ^ 2 ^  i r H 
o � N-1 N-1 -
= ^ ^ h - 1 ) S i 3 5 , 4 
These two values achieve the least mean square error of phases {(/>n}. They 
do not constitute a least mean square error estimate of the Fourier coefficients 
{J^n}-
In the simulation, we iterate the line-fitting several times. After each itera-
tion, we deduct the estimated f time shift from the next {Rn} before the line 
fitting (Fig. 3.4). The new Fourier coefficients {R'^} are 
Rf = gi[0+27rn/o(r-f)] + g^g-j27rn/of^ 
71/ 
In this way, the slope of the phase spectrum will reduce and hence less 2w phase 
jumps will appear. For noisy channels, we find multiple iterations improve the 
performance especially for large r. However, the estimated 0 is not used to 
adjust the carrier phase syncrhonization. This simplifies the carrier phase syn-
chronization procedure and does not adversely affect the algorithm performance. 
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3.3 Modulated Signals 
Now we consider the detection of modulated MC-CDMA signals. In this case, 
Rn = af^+2^^T] + � . 
We need to distinguish between the two cases ak 二 +1 and ak — —1- Using the 
estimates 0 and f obtained above, we calculate 
a. 二 ^ R n e - _ - f � ' � 
丄、n=0 
= 1 它 1 { q e ) [ 2 — � ( T - � ) + “ ] + ene-"[2—�f+^}. 
N n=0 
Then the decision symbol ak is taken to be the sign of the estimate symbol 知. 
See Figure 3.1. 
Assume each e^ is an i.i.d. Gaussian random variable with zero mean and 
variance 
M = R ^ ) ^ = a2, 
then the signal-to-noise ratio is 
N-1 1 j27rNfo{r-r) _ i 2 
SNR = ( | E e " � 4 ( T ’ ) / ( 7 V , 2 ) = ^ 6 何 。 ( 7 — ) 一 1 
n=0 
1 ^e^^Nfo{r-r) — e—,W�(T—))/j27r jlTre^^Nfo(—�飞 
二 J^ [e3^fo{r-r) — e-j7r/o(T-f))/j27r ^ j27Te^^Mr-r) 
2 
二 _ ^ Sm(7rNf0(T — f)) ^,^(N-l)fo(r-f) 
Na^ sin(7r/0(r — f ) ) 
—sm^7rNfo{r-r)) 
二 7Vo-2 sm^7rfo{r-r)y 
Note that if the time shift estimate is accurate, i.e. f = r , then the signal-to-




The transversal (i.e. discrete-time) matched filter is often used in the detection 
of DS-CDMA signals. It can be used in MC-CDMA also. It is based on the 
characteristics of the autocorrelation of the signalling pulse p{t). The discrete-
time autocorrelation function with rjN complex-valued samples per Th (where rj 
is a positive integer) is 
+) 二 pC^)pC^^r) 
.——_ Y^ V^ V^ *广 j27r(n'-n)i/{r]N) -j2TvnfoT 
= Z ^ Z ^ Z ^ V n ' e 
i ri n' 
r|N 
_ ^ ^ 匚氺 ^^^g-i27rn/oT ^ ^j27v{n'-n)i/{vN) 
n n' i=l 
if n — n\ 
r|N vN 
^ ^32^n-n')i/{vN) 二 ^  0^ = ”N 
i=l i=l 
if n + n' (Since r/ > 1, n — n, < N - 1 < rjN/2), 
r|N j2Tr{n-n') — i 
• j27T{n-n')i/{vN) _ j27r{n-n')/{vN)_^ f _ = 0 
2^ e — e ^j2^{n-n')/{vN) _ 1 一 u. 
i=l 
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So, 
N-1 
a(T) = " 7 V 5 3 M 2 e * / � T . 
n = 0 
If \Cn\ = 1, 
N-1 � l — e-j27riV/oT-
« ( r ) = , N E e - M T = , i V 1 —已一如知了 
n=0 L • 
, U^nNUr e—pNf�T�ij2TT j27vei^oT-
二 ”N ( g i 7 r / o r _ e - i 7 r / o r ) / j 2 7 T 乂 j27re_^oT _ 
= 、 , 城 调 。 丁 ) 广 条 低 丁 . 
s in(7r /�T) 
An implementation of the matched-filter detector is shown in Fig. 4.1, where 
the filter coeffcient p^ = p * ( ^ ) . The received signal r{t) is sampled rjN times 
per Tb. The sampled values enter the matched filter and the peaks in the output 
waveform correspond to the peaks in the autocorrelation function a{r) around 
T = 0. The sampled values are 
.iTb. .iTb. ATb. 
^7) = ^ W^'W . 
.iTb � ATb 
= w K ^ + T) + n ( ^ ) . 
Fig. 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 show the matched filter output with N 二 64, corre-
sponding to a sequence of information bits {ak} = {..., + ’ —, + , + , •••}. Note that 
the ofF-synch spikes between like information bits, e.g. {."，+, + , ...}，are gener-
ally small, while those between opposite information bits, e.g. {..., + , —,...} or 
{..., —, + , . . . } , can be larger. 
The data shaping comparator performs the detection. It employs certain, 
possibly ad hoc, methods to look for signals only at or near the correctly syn-
chronized samples. We assume a certain synchronization preamble is used to 
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Shift Register 
! i ^ _ j T . . " ~ r p 
V --^Mr" — f i 
riN-l 〉伪、人 ~ ~ > Data 
TlN-2 ^ ^ 2 ^ ^ Shaping ^ 
.' V _ 
/ ^ Comparator 
P2 K x H ^ 
Pi K x ^ H _ _ l 
Figure 4.1: The Block Diagram of the Matched Filter 
assist the comparator determine the bit (frame) synchronization of the received 
waveform, i.e. to determine which sample within each frame of r]N samples to 
perform detection. Then a binary decision on that sample produces the detec-
tor output hk. Matched filter output samples between detection moments are 
ignored. 
There are many known implementations of the synchronization preamble. 
For example, a string of +，s can be transmitted (periodically if necessary), re-
sulting in a signal which produces distinct peaks at the matched filter output. 
The comparator can also inspect more than one samples in the vicinity of the 
synchronized moment in order to make a better decision on hk- The detection 
moments can also be adaptively adjusted to improve performance. However, 
the sample timing of r{t) is not adjusted. We use a fixed clock to trigger the 
analog-to-digital converter. 
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Performance and Conclusion 
5.1 Line Fitting Algorithm 
The performance of the phase estimator for unmodulated signal was evaluated 
over different time shifts and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). In the simulation, we 
use an MC-CDMA signal with 64 carriers and carrier frequency f�二 lOkHz in 
an AWGN channel. The number of iterations is 10. The result is the root-mean-
square (RMS) error of 干.We find that the performance is close except for time 
shift 二 Tb/2 in large noise (Fig. 5.1). When 丁 = T&/2 and 0 = 0, 
R^ 二 已 3 一 _ + e, = 6 揮 + e^. 
So the phase vector in absence of noise is (0,7r,. • • ’ 0,7v). For those values 二 7r, 
noise will easily change them to negative values and cycle compensation is hard 
to apply here. 
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Figure 5.1: The RMS Error against SNR(left) and Time Shift (right) for un-
modulated model 
In practical MC-CDMA system, we can use the unmodulated synchronization 
preamble for initial time shift acquisition. It is similar to use many iterations in 
the simulation to improve the performance. 
5.2 Matched Filter 
Assume the noise values rn = n{iTb/r]N) are i.i.d Gaussian random variables 
with zero mean and variance ciK Then the signal-to-noise ratio of the transveral 
matched filter is [12 
T)N vN 
SNR = |^p,5(zT,/r/7V)lV(a2^b,|2) 
=|:"^)|2/(却)） 
N-1 
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Figure 5.2: The Minimum Peak for Figure 5.3: The Minimum Peak for 
different rj for in-phase modulation different rj for complex modulation 
Assume an intelligent algorithm is used to perform symbol detections on the 
filter output samples nearest to the peaks, then |r| < %|{2r]N). However, no 
feedback mechanism, such as a PLL, is used to reduce r further. We anslyze 
the relationship between SNR and r in Figure 5.3 with N 二 64 (horizontally 
1 二 Tb/{fjN) and vertically l=VSNR at r 二 0). The performances can degrade 
as much as 3.9 dB at r 二 Tb/{2r]N), when rj = 1. Increases 7/, i.e. sampling 
faster reduces the degradation, but also increases the complexity and hence it is 
expensive. 
Remark (1) We use I /Q demodulations above. If only in-phase modulation 
and demodulation are used, then the performance slack-off due to ofF-peak sam-
pling is more severe (Figure 5.2, and with different vertical scale). (2) Increasing 
T] also increases the noise power a^. Usually there is no net increase in SNR at 
T = 0. 
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Comparing with the matched filter, the line fitting algorithm has the poten-
tial of achieving better SNR. However, the two can be combined. The matched 
filter algorithm can be used in the preamble to reduce the time shift r to within 
Tb/{2rjN), followed by the line-fitting algorithm for detecting modulated signals. 
A smaller r improves the performance of the line fitting algorithm. 
5.3 Conclusion 
In the first part of the thesis, we proposed two algorithms for detecting multi-
carrier CDMA signals. A fixed sampling clock is used to keep the circuitry 
simple. No feedback mechanism such as a PLL is used. The matched filter 
calculates the correlation of the received signal with the pulse. The peak value 
of the function can determine the time shift of the signal. The performance of 
the matched filter is limited by the number of stage rjN (or the sampling rate). 
The line fitting algorithm uses the linear property of the phase spectrum of the 
multi-carrier signal. It has potentially higher performance, but further research 










6.1 Introduction to Cryptography 
Cryptography has its history for over thousands of years. In the past, it is mainly 
for military use to enable two parties to exchange secret without being known 
by the third party. Before the invention of computing machine or computer, the 
process to convert the message is done by human or just some simple equipment. 
The studies of these methods are called Classical Cryptography. 
A simple cryptosystem is shown in Figure 6.1, the user A who sends the 
message is called the sender and the user B who receives the message is called 
the receiver. The message sent by A is called plaintext and the process 
to convert the plaintext into some messages which cannot be understood by 
the third party is called encryption. The message after encryption is called 
ciphertext and the reverse process to convert the ciphertext back to its original 
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Encryption Key Decryption key 
k k' 
A ~ ~ ~ ^ n ~ ~ ~ " B 
^ Encryption ^ Channel *• Decryption *^  
Plaintext ' , ' . , , ^ OriginalPlaintext 
Ciphertext Ciphertext 
Opponent 
Figure 6.1: Simple Encryption and Decryption Model 丨 
plaintext is called decryption. The media for the transmission of the ciphertext 
is called channel which can be human, letter, telephone, radio or computer. In 
most cases, the encryption and the decryption processes require some parameters 
called key. The key for encryption is encryption key k whereas the key for 
decryption is decryption key k, [20 . 
In modern technology, the advance of computer and telecommunication net-
works introduces many new problems that require some advanced cryptographic 
algorithms to solve them. These problems includes (i) verification of user iden-
tity, (ii) transmission of secret personal data, (iii) transmission of electronic 
signed document, (iv) electronic commerce and so on. 
6.1.1 Classical Cryptography 
Before we talk about the cryptosystems used nowadays, lets first have an overview 
of some classical cryptosystems used in past. The main idea beyond these cryp-
tosystems is substitution and transposition, which means that to replace certain 
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letters with others or to rearrange the order of the letters in the message [19, 20 . 
1. Substitution Cipher - it is one of the most common classical cryptosys-
tems. Using this system, each letter is replaced by another one according 
to a certain permutation 7r. The pattern of the permutation forms the key 
of the system. If we consider the set of all English alphabets, there are 26! 
permutation. 
2. Shift Cipher - it is the simplest form of substitution cipher. The per-
mutation is just a fixed shift of k, i.e. each alphabet is shifted by k. If 
the shift k 二 3, it is called the Caesar Cipher, which was used by Julius 
Caesar. In this case, a.is shifted to D, b is shifted to E and so on. 
3. The Vigenere Cipher - the cryptosystems mentioned above is called 
a monoalphabetic substitution, each letter is replaced by another one. 
In Vigenere Cipher, each time m letters are encrypted by the key k = 
{ki, k2,... ’ km}. For the plaintext V = X1,X2,.. .，the ciphertext will be 
C 二 y i , " 2 , . . . where yjm+i 二 xj^+i + k (mod 26) i = 0,1, . •. ’ m 1. 
The Vigenere Cipher is a kind of polyalphabetic substitution. 
4. Transposition Cipher - for the Substitution Cipher discussed above, 
the plaintext is replaced by some other characters. In Transposi t ion 
Cipher (or sometimes called Permutation Cipher), all the characters 
in the plaintext remain the same, except that the order of them are re-
arranged. Suppose we have a key with length m, then the plaintext is 
divided into many groups of characters of length m. For each group of the 
characters, they are permutated according to the pattern of the key. 
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6.1,2 Cryptanalysis 
Cryptanalysis is the study or science to determine the original plaintext with-
out the knowledge of the key. There is a general assumption that the type cryp-
tosystem used is known. People who study cryptanalysis is known as Cryptan-
alysts. With some knowledge of the plaintext or ciphertext, cryptanalyst can 
increase the chance of successful cryptanalysis. Some general type of cryptanal-
ysis are shown as follow in order of their strength, (i) ciphertext-only, (ii) known 
plaintext, (iii) chosen plaintext and (iv) chosen ciphertext. 
6.2 Introduction to Internet Security 
6.2,1 The Origin of Internet 
In early years, most networks are operated independently by a small group of 
people. And it is almost impossible to setup a global network to cover all users. 
The evolution of internetworking technology makes it possible to interconnect 
different physical networks over the world transparently. One main early Inter-
net technology are developed by the Defense A d v a n c e d Research P r o j e c t s 
A g e n c y (DARPA) in mid 1970s. They developed the standard for internetwork-
ing and routing which is called Transmission Contro l Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP) [21]. The TCP/IP technology was employed to connect 
many research institutions to those of DARPA and is so called c o n n e c t e d In-
ternet or just Internet. 
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In around 1980, the ARPANET was used as the backbone of the new In-
ternet using TCP/ IP technology. In early 1983, the Defense Communication 
Agency (DCA) splitted the ARPANET into the research part which still called 
ARPANET and the military part called MILNET. The ARPANET technology 
has great influence to today's Internet. Some early Internet services include [N 
• 
1. Electronic mail - Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). , 
2. File transfer - File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and Network File System 
(NFS). 
3. Remote login - TELNET, to connect remote systems via the network. 
4. Information services - Gopher, Wide Area Information Service (WAIS) and 
World Wide Web (WWW) . 
5. Remote Procedure Call (RPC) services - Network File System (NFS), al-
lows systems to share directories and disks and Network Information Ser-
vices (NIS), allows multiple systems to share database. 
6.2.2 Internet Security 
The first thing related to network and Internet security is password. A user 
needs to enter his password while login so as to identify his identity. Therefore, 
a proper selection of password is very important. Within a local network, there 
are many ways to enforce security. The security problem become more complex if 
we consider interconnected network. The rapid growth and openness of Internet 
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make Internet vulnerable and a easy path to attack connected hosts. Moreover, 
these security problems become a barrier for people and companies who want 
to join or do business in the Internet. 
Today, private key cryptosystems are widely employed in conjunction with 
public key cryptosystems to enhance Internet security. Private key cryptosys-
tems are used for messsage encryption and decryption and public key cryp-
tosystems are used for key distribution and authentication. Authentication is 
achieved by means of digital signature based on public key cryptography which | 
) 
is analogous to written signature. Moreover, one-way hashing or message digest | 
! 
function like Message Digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) can 
provide message integrity check. 
Meanwhile, it is also common to setup firewalls for Internet security. A fire-
wall acts as a filter between the Internet and the trusted network such that only 
authorized information can pass through the network. Moreover, many appli-
cations are now available for Internet security like Kerberos for authentication, 
Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) for electronic 
mail and message encryption. Besides, many Internet browsers nowaday also ap-
ply different private and public key algorithms to provide their security services 
like Secure NCSA Mosaic, Netscape Navigator and SunSoft HotJava. 
6.2.3 Internet Commerce 
As mentioned before, there is rapid increase in the number of Internet sub-
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include newsgroup, ftp, gopher and many be most important, e-mail and World-
wide Web. Through these services, people can access information all over the 
world without leaving homes or offices. For example, a user can communi-
cate with other users overseas using e-mail, newsgroup and Internet phone. A 
user can also download some softwares, documents by FTP. With the use of 
World-wide Web, users can access many Internet services and data with differ-
ent formats like image, audio and video. 
The rapid growth, wide range of provided services and popularity of Internet 
initiates a new environment and media for merchant to do business. Through the 
use of Internet, merchants can promote their products and services by different ！ 
丨 
media like text, image, audio and video. Meanwhile, a consumer can send his ' 
feedback or purchase order to the merchant through Internet. 
To purchase over the Internet, a consumer can select the desired products 
or services from the merchant's homepage and pay the money offline. However, 
to increase flexibility, it is desirable that the consumer can pay directly over 
the Internet. For example, the payer can send his credit card number over 
the Internet through e-mail or other formats and the payee can then charge the 
payer's account. However, the Internet is vulnerable to attack, so it is important 
to design a system to ensure secure transaction over the Internet. Many different 
electronic commerce systems have been proposed and in use now, a consumer 
can pay using his credit card or two new payment methods, electronic cheque 
and electronic cash. These payment methods deploy many advance private and 






Elementary Number Theory 
1 
7.1 Finite Field Theory 
In modern cryptography, it is common to perform computation over finite field | 
I 
|. 
in many popular private and public key algorithms (eg. IDEA, RC5, RSA， ： 
Diffie-Hellman). So lets first have an overview of finite field theory and some j 
f 
• I 
related algorithms. ‘ 
I 
The ring formed by the residue elements of the integer ring over modulo q 
operation is called a quotient ring Z/{q) with elements {0 ,1 ,2 , . • • ’ q - 1}. The 
quotient ring Z/{p) formed by the residue elements of the integer ring modulo 
a prime number p is a finite field. A finite field can also be considered as a field 
that has finite number of elements and the number of elements in a finite field 
is called the order. The field Z|{q) is an example of finite field and called the 
Galois field {GF{q)). 
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7.1.1 Euclidean Algorithm 
The Euclidean Algorithm is used to compute the Greatest Common Di-
visor (GCD) of two integers. For any integers a, b, r and g, if a = qb + r then, 
gcd{a, b) 二 gcd[b,r). For any two integer a,p, if gcd{a,p) = 1, then they are 
said to be relatively prime or coprime. 




If p is a prime, and p does not divide a, then a^"^ = 1 (mod p). | 
i 
丨! i 
Extended Euclidean Algorithm 丨 
The Extended Euclidean Algorithm is used to find the integer solutions x 丨 
and y satisfying the equation ax + py = gcd{a,p). If we consider the equation | 
j . 
in modulo p, then ax = gcd{a,p) (mod p). When gcd{a,p) = 1, the solution x j 
is said to be the inverse of a modulo p, a—i 三 a; (mod p) [19]. 
/ 
7.1.2 Chinese Remainder Theorem 
The Chinese Remainder Theorem was first proposed by a great Chinese 
military strategist Suen Zi. He used this theorem to count the number of soldiers 
in the army [19]. This problem can be formulated as a system of equations and 
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solve X, 
‘ 
X 三 ai (mod pi) 
X 三 tt2 (mod p2) 
< 
X 三 an (mod pn), 
\ 
where n,P2,...,Pn are all positive integers with gcd{pi,pj) 二 1 and 1 + j. 
Then we can find the solution a: satisfys the equation x 三 a (mod P) with 
p = nr=iPi. Let Pi = P/pi (for 1 < i < n), then use the Extended Euclidean 
Algorithm to find the inverse of Pi modulo pi, that is 仏.=P,~^  (mod pi) (for 
1 < i < n). The solution will be, 
n 
X 二 ^  qiPiCii (mod P). 
i^i 
Some examples of Chinese Remainder Theorem are described in the Appendix. 
7.1.3 Modular Exponentiation 
In many public-key cryptosystems (like RSA and ElGamal), the encryption and 
decryption processes must involve the computation of the power of an integer 
modulo p {a^ (mod p)). This process is known as m o d u l a r exponent ia t i on 
[19]. One simple calculation is the square and multiply method. To calculate 
a^ (mod p), first find the binary representation of b such that b = Ef=o bi2\ 
Then first initialize with y = 1 and start from i 二 k — 1 and down to 0, 
1. Replace y 二 y) (mod p). 
2. If bi 二 1, replace y = y x a (mod p). 
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The resultant value will be y 二 a^ (mod p). The main idea is to reduce the 
problem to modular multiplication so that at most 2k modular multiplica-
tions are required. Furthermore, if p is a prime number and does not divide 
a, applying Fermat's Little Theorem that a" 二 1 (mod p), the modular ex-
ponentiation can be simplified by a^ (mod p) = a" (mod p) where c = b 
(mod p — 1). Then use the algorithm above with power c such that the number 
of multiplication can be further reduced. 
7.2 One-way Hashing Function 
1. An One-way Hashing Function h is defined as, for an arbitrary mes-
sage M, it is easy to compute its message digest d = h{M). But it is 
I computationally infeasible to compute the message M from d. 
( . 
2. For an arbitrary message M, if it is computationally infeasible to find 
another message M' such that h{M) = h{M'), then h is weakly collision-
free. 
3. If it is computationally infeasible to find two messages M and M' such 
that h{M) = h[M'), then h is strongly collision-free [19:. 
According to birthday paradox, you need 183 person such that the probability 
that one of them has the same birthday as you is greater than 1/2. However, 
only 23 person is needed such that the probability that there exists two person 
with same birthday is greater than 1/2. This phenomenon is also known as the 
birthday attack. 
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The problem of birthday attack is related to the size of the message digest d. 
If the message digest is m-bit long, it needs 2™ random trials to find a message 
which has same message digest as a specific message. However, like birthday 
attack, it needs only 2 ^ " random trials to find two messages which have same 
message digest. It is suggested that the length of the message digest should ‘ . 
be at least 128 bits, so the birthday attack needs 2®^  random trials to find two 
messages with same message digest. 
7.2.1 MD2 
M D 2 is a message-digest algorithm proposed by J. Linn and R. Rivest. It 
is an algorithm to perform one-way hashing of an input message of arbitrary 
length and outputs a 128-bit message digest This algorithm [A] is designed 
for compressing a document before signed by digital signature of a public-key 
cryptosystem. It is used by PEM, an Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail standard. 
I i 1 
7.2.2 MD5 
M D 5 is another message-digest algorithm proposed by R. Rivest [B]. Like MD2, 
it is an algorithm to perform one-way hashing of an input message of arbitrary 
length and outputs a 128-bit message digest. 
Firstly, padding bits are appended to the message so that the length will 
be 448 mod 512. Then the 64-bit representation of the message length before 
padding is appended to the padded message. In this way, the length of the 
I 
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resultant message will be a multiple of 512 bits. For each iteration of the main 
loop, a block of 512 bits (sixteen 32-bit words) padded message is used for 
manipulation. In the next step, 4 registers are initialized with A 二 0x67452301, 
B = 0xefcdab89, C = 0x98badcfe and D = 0x10325476. 
These initial values are stored as AA, BB, CC and DD, and A，B, C and D 
will then be used in the main loop. The main loop has 4 rounds and each round 
has 16 operations. Each operation first involves a function that intakes three of 
the registers (A,B,C,D) and performs bitwise operation {AND, OR, NOT, XOR) 
to them. The output is added to the remained register, one of the sixteen 32-bit 
block of the message and a special constant t. The output sum will undergo a 
circular left shift of 5 bits and finally add this result back to one of the register. 
After these 64 operations, the resultant values A, B, C and D are added back 
to their initial values AA, BB, CC and DD. The 128-bit message digest will be 
the concatenation of these results A, B，C and D. 
7.3 Prime Number 
A Prime number is a number which has no factor except 1 and itself. A 
number which has factor other than l and itself is composite. Prime number 
is used in generation of key in some public key cryptosystems like Diffie-Hellman 
and RSA. Many proofs have already shown that there are infinite many primes 
and the number of primes < x is approximately x| log x [23, 24 . 
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7.3.1 Listing of Prime Number 
Two simple ways to find a list of prime numbers includes [24], 
1. Trial by Division - For an arbitrary integer n, if there does not exist any 
integer p < y ^ which is divisible by n, then n is a prime number. 
2. Sieve of Eratosthenes - This method relys on the elimination of com-
posite. Firstly, 2 is sieved so as to remove all multiples of 2 except 2. Then 
the smallest unsieved number left, 3 is sieved. The process is repeated for 
5，7，11,... ,pk,pk+i so that all composite < pl_^_^ will be eliminated. 
7.3.2 Primality Testing 
The prime numbers used in cryptosystem are usually very large (up to several 
hundreds of bits). To generate such a large prime, it is common to gener-
ate a large random number and test for primality. Those numbers who pass 
the primality testing h.ave high probabilities that they are prime. Common 
algorithms include the Solovay and Strassen's test and the Rabin's test 
discussed below. 
Quadratic Residues 
Consider a prime p > 2 that does not divides an integer a. If the congruence 
a 三 62 (mod p) has a solution b G Zp, then a is said to be a quadratic residue 
modulo p, otherwise, a is a nonquadratic residue modulo p [19, 23 . 
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From this, Legendre has defined the Legendre symbol, 
/ 
0 a 三 0 (mod p) 
fa\ 1 1 
—二 < 1 a is a quadratic residue modulo p 
\Pj 
—1 a is a nonquadratic residue modulo p. 
\ 
Solovay and Strassen's Test 
Solovay and Strassen's Method is a Monte Carlo primality testing method based 
on the properties of Legendre symbol [23]. To test if an integer N is prime, 
1. Choose an integer a < N such that gcd{a,N) = 1. 
2. Test if the Euler，s Criterion is satisified, 
r.S.‘ 
( _ ^ )三以 (況 - 1 ) / 2 ( m o d N). 
\NJ K 
If the above congruence does not hold, then N is said to be composite. If it 
holds, repeats step 1 and 2. If the test passed for k times, then N is a prime 
with a probability of at least 1 — l/2^. 
Rabin's Test 
This method is based on the Miller's test which is more accurate than Solovay 
and Strassen's test [23]. To test if an integer N is prime, 
1. Choose an integer a < N such that gcd{a, N) 二 1. 
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2. Test if N satisfies the condition for strong pseudoprime in base a, 
a^ 三 1 (mod N) d is odd such that N - 1 = 2'd 
a^^^ 三一1 (mod N) for some r, 0 < r < s. 
If the above congruences do not hold, then N is said to be composite. If they 
hold, repeats step 1 and 2. If the test passed for k times, then N is a prime with 
a probability of at least 1 — l/4^. 
7.4 Random/Pseudo-Random Number 
Random numbers (RN) are widely used in many cryptosystems. For example, 
to generate cryptographic keys or passwords, random numbers are needed [C, 
27]. The selection of random source or random-number generating technique 
has great influence to the security of a cryptosystem. 
In many computer applications, random numbers are generated by some 
deterministic algorithms. These numbers generated are not truly random, in 
fact, they should be denoted as pseudo-random numbers (PRN). A desired 
PRN sequence should have, (i) sufficently large least period, (ii) good statistical 
properties and (iii) efficient algorithms�[26 . 
Examples of Hardware Random Source 
The first example is use the input of some analog audio or video source to a 
computer. The digitized input source can be an audio digitizer with no input 
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source or a video camera with the lens covered such that the detected input 
will like thermal noise. The second method uses low level disk seek time of a 
system with small random fluctuations in disk drives rotational speed because of 
chaotic air turbulence [27]. Other examples include radioactive source, quantum 
efFects in semiconductor devices [C], measure of timing and content of mouse 
movement, key strokes under some requirements [27 . 
Insecure Random Source 
Some random sources or generating techniques which are commonly used in 
many general purpose applications may be insecure for cryptograhical use. Ex-
amples include the system clock value, process runtime and other network statis-
tics. Moreover, the use of a very complex random number generation algorithm 
may not help if there is no theory behind or analysis of the algorithm. Published 
data on CD or other large database are also insecure if the adversary can also 
access the same database [C, 27]. 
Uses of Mixing Function 
广 One way to increase the randomness of a number is to use a number of correlated 
random input sources and mix them together by mixing functions like hashing 
or message digest functions [27]. These functions use inputs of arbitrary length 
and output a fixed length output (160 bits for SHA and 128 bits for MD2, MD4, 
MD5). As described before, it is difficult to compute the input from the message 
digest. Besides message digest functions, some encryption algorithms can also 
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be used for mixing function like DES and Diffie-Hellman. 
7.4.1 Examples of Random Number Generator 
Linear Congruential Generator 
First select integers a,b,n such that n > 2 and 1 < a,b < n - 1. Define 
k 二� l og2 n] and let k + 1 < 1 < n — 1. For a seed 如,where 0 < <So < n - 1, 
start from i — 1 to /, 
Si = {asi-i + b) (mod n), 
and the /-bit generator output is r 二 (?^i,r2，.. . , n ) where r^  is the least signif-
icant bit of Si. This generator has a period no greater than n. If a,b, and n 
are properly chosen, then the generator will be a maximal length generator with 
period n. However, some studies show that linear congruential generator is not 
secure enough for cryptographical applications [18 . 
RSA Generator 
Let p,q to be two A;/2-bit primes, and define n = pq. Select b such that 
gcd{b, ^{n)) = 1. Like RSA cryptosystem, n and b are public while p and q 
are kept secret. The seed 5o is any A>bit element of Z^. Start form i = 1 to /, 
define 
5^1 = 5- (mod n), 
and the generator output is r 二 (r i ,r2, . . . , n ) where ri is the least significant 
bit of Si. The security of RSA generator depends on the difficulty to break RSA 
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cryptosystem [19 . 
Blum-Blum-Shub Generator 
This generator is based on the quadratic residue modulo n and Legendre symbol 
defined before [18, 19]. First select two primes p,q where p = q 三 3 (mod 4) 
and n = pq. The seed So used should be a quadratic residues modulo n {so G {x^ 
(mod n) : X e ^ * } ) . Start from i = 1 to /，define, 
Si = s�—i (mod n), 
and the generator output is r 二 (ri,r2, •. . , r / ) where n is the least significant 
log2(log2(<Si)) bits of Si. Moreover, it is possible to compute a particular s,-
directly from So since, 
Si 二 5-_i (mod n) - (5J_2 (mod n)f (mod n) = • •. 
= 5 ^ (mod n) = 4^ ―糊（modn), 
where ¢{71) 二 {p — l){q — 1). Just like the RSA generator, n is public while p 




Private Key and Public Key 
Cryptography 
8.1 Block Ciphers 
In block cipher, each time a fixed length of plaintext is converted to a fixed 
length ciphertext. The design of the encryption and decryption process is that 
every bit in a ciphertext block should jointly depends on every bit in the plaintext 
block and key block. A block of random number called the initialization vector 
is used for the encryption of the first plaintext block so that the same plaintext 
will not encrypt to same ciphertext each time. 
Since the size of the message may not be multiple of block size, certain 
padding bit string should be appended to the end of the message. The bit string 
can be a sequence of zero with a pad count at the end to specify the number of bits 
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appended. If the message is a multiple of block size, an extra block of padding 
should be appended to the message [28]. Using cipher block chaining (CBC) 
mode, each time the plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext 
block before encryption. Using cipher feedback (CFB) mode, each time a 
data portion smaller than the block size is encrypted [18 . 
8.1.1 Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
In early 1970s' the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), now the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), started a program to request the 
US industry to develop a standard cryptosystem. One proposal is the Lucifer 
developed by IBM, after some modifications and simplifications, it became the 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) in 1977 [18，29]. DES is a block cipher with 
I 64 bits block size and keysize. However, only 56 bits of the key is used whereas 
the remaining 8 bits are used for parity checks. 
The encryption process is shown in Figure 8.1, the message is first divided 
into blocks of 64 bits size. Each 64-bit block is permuted by the initial permuta-
tion (IP) such that the 58-th bit goes to output bit 1, 50-th bit goes to bit 2 and 
so on. Then let the leftmost 32 bits be Lo and the rightmost 32 bits be Ro. They 
become the input of 16-round iterations. Suppose Li—i and Ri-i{l < i < 16) be 
the leftmost 32 bits and the rightmost 32 bits respectively in each round. Then, 
Li — Ri- i and Ri = Li-i � / ( i^_ i , / i^ ) . 
The 48-bit I<i is generated by the 64-bit encryption key K. In K, bits 
8 ,16, . . • 64 are the odd parity check bits. The remaining 56 bits are extracted 
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Figure 8.1: The Encryption Algorithm of DES 
and permutated by the key permutation (PC-1). Let the leftmost 28-bit output 
of PC-1 be K' and the rightmost 28-bit be K", in each of the subsequent round, 
K' and K" will undergo a cyclic leftshift of 1 or 2 bits. The shift in rounds 1, 2, 
9 and 16 is 1 where the other rounds are 2. The shifted output in round i will 
be permuted by the compression permutation (PC-2) and the output is K{. 
For the function f , first the 32-bit Ri is expanded to a 48-bit block by a 
expansion permutation (EP), bitwisely XORed with I<i and then divided into 
eight 6-bit subblock Uj{l < j < 8). Each Uj will enter the S-box Sj and outputs 
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a 4-bit subblock Vj. Suppose the binary representation of Ui is U1U2 . • • We, then 
Vj will be the binary representation of {Sj)ab- {Sj)ab means the entry of row a 
and column b in S-box Sj with a = UiUQ and h = U2U3U4U5. The S-box outputs 
U1U2 . • • Ug after permuted by the P-box will be the output f{Ri-i,Ki). 
After 16 rounds of computation, the output is permuted by the inverse initial 
permutation (IP_i) and produce the final output. The decryption process is 
similar to encryption, the same function f can be used with the key Ki used in 
reverse order. In decryption, the key subblock K' and K" undergo cyclic right 
shift, the shift in round 1, 8, 15 and 16 is 1 where the others are 2 [18, 29 . 
8.1.2 International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) 
The International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) is first developed 
by X. Lai and J. Massey [D]. It is a symmetrical block cipher algorithm with 64-
bit block length and 128-bit key (twice as long as for DES). The main operation 
of this algorithm involves three main algebraic groups that operate on 16-bit 
subblock each time includes, (i) bitwise XOR, (ii) modulo 2^ ® addition, and (iii) 
modulo 2i6 + 1 (Fermat prime) multiplication with value，0’ not used but uses 
216 to represent all-zero 16-bit block. 
The encryption and decryption algorithms can be illustrated by Fig.8.2. 
Firstly, the 64-bit block of plaintext is divided into four 16-bit subblocks, X1,X2, 
X3 and X4. These four 16-bit subblocks are transformed into four 16-bit cipher-
text subblocks V1,Y2,Y3 and ¥4 through 9 rounds of operation. In each of the 
54 
I Chapter 8 Private Key and Public Key Cryptography 
first 8 rounds, those intermediate 16-bit subblocks will undergo XOR, addi- ,,„ 
：；! 
tion and multiplication described above with six 16-bit keys Z{, Z ; , . •., Z^{i = f 
1,2,...，8). In the last round, only addition and multiplication are involved with f；： 
four 16-bit keys Z\,Z\,Z\ and Z\. So there are total 52 key blocks used for 
both encryption and decryption, which is generated by the 128-bit key. 
According to Ascom Systec, IDEA has been implemented as a chip with an 
encryption rate of 177 Mbit/s on a device with a system clock frequency of 25 
MHz [30]. Moreover, this algorithm is now available to North America [E]. ;i 
8.1.3 RC5 
RC5 is a new variable-key-size symmetric block cipher proposed by R. L. Rivest 
of RSA Data Security [F]. RC5 is a parameterized algorithm and can be denoted 
as RC5 — w/r/b with parameters w^ r and b, ； 
1. w - The word size in bits and possible values are 16, 32 and 64. The 
plaintext and ciphertext blocks are two-word blocks {2w bits). 
I 
2. r - The number of rounds and possible values are 0 to 255. The user can 
select different value to trade-off between time efficiency and security. 
3. h - The private key size in bytes and possible values are 0 to 255. Flexible 
key-size can provide different security and fulfill the export restriction. 
For example, RC5-32/16/7 can provide the same number of rounds and key-size 
as in DES. The proposed "nominal" values of the parameters is RC5-32/12/16. 
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The main algorithm of RC5 consists of encryption, decryption and the key 
expansion algorithm. Three primitive operations are used in this algorithm: 
1. Modulo 2^ addition of words using two's complement and denoted by，’+，，, 
2. bitwise XOR denoted by，,®,，，and 
-
3. cyclic left rotation of words denoted by x « < s. 
The key expansion expands the private key K to an expanded key array S of 
size 2(r + 1). This algorithm uses two 2w length binary constants P^ and Qyj, 
凡 二 Odd[(e — 2)2-) and Q^ = Odd{{^ - l)2^). 
Odd{x) means the odd integer nearest to x, e is the base of natural logarithms 
and (/) is the golden ratio. The cyclic rotation of RC5 is the only non-linear opera-
tor and the number of rotation is a variable (plaintext-dependent). The strength 
of RC5 greatly depends on the data-dependent rotations since the amount of ro-
tation is not predetermined. 
8.2 Stream Ciphers 
In stream cipher, each time only one bit of plaintext is encrypted into cipher-
text. The encryption process is that the encryption key enters the keystream 
generator and outputs a keystream ^ , k2,. •.，k. The plaintext stream is XORed 
with the keystream to produce the ciphertext stream, c‘ ： pi � k . The decryp-
tion process is similar in which the ciphertext stream is XORed with the original 
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keystream, c,- ® ki = pi ® ki © k = p“ Like block cipher, an initialization vector 
should be used. One possible implementation of the keystream generator is the 
linear feedback shift register (LFSR). 
In synchronous stream cipher, if there is one bit error in the ciphertext, the 
synchronization will loss. It is advantage that the advesary cannot make inser-
tion or deletion to the message without being detected. In self-synchronizing 
stream cipher, each time n ciphertext bits are feedback to the keystream gener-
ator. Therefore one bit error will propagate to at most n ciphertext bits [31 . 
For a good stream ciphers, (i) the period should be large (the period is the 
minimum value p such that k+p 二 k), (ii) the shortest length of a unique LFSR 
to produce k called the linear complexity should be large and (iii) the keystream 
should be a random/pseudo-random sequence [31]. Using stream ciphers, no 
minimum block size is required as in block ciphers. However, initailization vec-
tor is required for all stream ciphers and must be changed frequently but not 
necessary for block ciphers [28 . 
8.2.1 RC2 and RC4 
RC2 and RC4 are two variable-key-size encryption functions designed by R. L. 
Rivest [G]. According to RSADSI, RC2 is a variable-key-size symmetric block 
cipher and can be used as an alternative of DES. RSADSI claims that RC2 is 
approximately twice as fast as DES (with triple encryption) when implemented 
in software. RC4 is a variable-key-size symmetric stream cipher and RSADSI 
claims that RC4 is 10 or more times as fast as DES when implemented in 
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software. 
RSADSI claims that RC2 and RC4 can be more secure than DES because 
they can use long key sizes, but less secure when the key sizes are short. However, 
both RC2 and RC4 are proprietary algorithms of RSADSI and the details of the 
algorithms have not been published. Therefore, it is difficult to prove that if RC2 
and RC4 are really more secure than DES. Though RC2 and RC4 are variable-
key-size, it is common to use key sizes of 128 bits for local use in U.S. and 
this version cannot export. Nevertheless, an agreement between the Software 
Publishers Association (SPA) and the U.S. government gives RC2 and RC4 
special status so that they can export if the key sizes are limited to 40 bits. 
8.3 Public Key Cryptosystem 
In traditional private key crytposystems, there exist some limitations [32, 29], 
1. The key management and distribution problem - suppose there are n users 
in the system, since each pair of user share a key which is kept secret to the 
others, so as a total, n{n-l)|2 private keys are required. Moreover, before 
actual communication, each pair of user requires some secure channels like 
mail or personal contact to exchange their keys in advance. 
2. The authentication problem - it is difficult to use conventional cryptosys-
tem as an authentication system, for example, to validate the identity of 
a user or to verify a signed message by digital signature. 
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These disadvantages raised people's interest to develop a new kind of cryp-
tosystem. In 1976, W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman published a paper "New direc-
tions in cryptography" and proposed the concept of public key cryptosystem. 
In public key cryptosystem, the encryption key Ck and decryption key dk are dis-
tinct. The encryption key is published while the decryption key is kept secret. It 
is computational infeasible to compute 4 given e^ and vice versa. Suppose user 
A wants to send a secret message M to user B, A will look up B's encryption key 
in some public directories. A encrypts the message to C = EsiM) and sends it 
to B. When B received the ciphertext C, he decrypts C by his decryption key, 
DB{C) = DB{EB{M)) = M [32]. 
Trapdoor One-way Functions 
The encryption and decryption algorithms employ the concept of t r a p d o o r 
one-way functions. A function f : M — C is said to be one-way if it is 
computable in polynomial time to compute / ( m ) , m G M but computation 
infeasible to compute the inverse / _ i ( c ) , c G C. Moreover, an one-way function 
g ： M ~> C is said to be a t rapdoor one-way function if a special parameter 
k called the t rapdoor can make the computation of gk^{c), c G C easy [36 . 
A public key cryptosystem can use certain trapdoor one-way function /e as 
the encryption function and the inverse fJ^ as the decryption function. The 
parameter e is the public key and the trapdoor d is the private key. Some 
popular public key cryptosystems include : (i) the Diffie-Hellman system, (ii) 
the RSA system and (iii) the elliptic curve cryptosystem. 
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8.3.1 Diffle-Hellman 
The Diffie-Hellman system is a public key distribution system developed by 
W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman [32]. Suppose users A and B want to exchanged 
a private key over an insecure channel before communication, they first agree 
on a large prime number n and a large primitive element a G Z^- Users A 
and B independently generate random numbers x and y respectively such that 
1 < X, y < n — 1 and keep them secret. Then A and B compute, 
X = a^ (mod n) and Y = a" (mod n) 
respectively and place X and Y in a public file. A lookups Y from the public 
file and computes the secret key KAB, 
KAB = y^ (mod n) = a^y (mod n), 
and B can also compute this key using X from the public file, 
KAB = X^ (mod n) = « • (mod n). 
The security of this system depends on the difficulty to compute logarithms 
modulo n. It means that it is easy to calculate X = a^ (mod n) but very 
difficult to calculate x = log^ X (mod n). 
8.3.2 Knapsack Algorithm 
The Knapsack Algorithm is proposed by R. Merkle and M. E. Hellman in 
1978. This algorithm is based on the knapsack problem that given a knapsack 
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of length S and a set {a} with n rods of the length a1,a2, • •., cLn respectively. 
The problem is to find a subset {as} C {a} such that, 
n 
S = ^ ai = ^bitti, 
aie{as} «=1 
where (¾, 62,...，K) = b is a binary sequence. The difficulty of the knapsack 
problem is that it is computationally infeasible to find the sequence b given the 
knapsack S and {a } . 
The main idea of the algorithm is based on an easy knapsack and a hard 
knapsack problem. The public key {a'} is the hard knapsack whereas the pri-
vate keys {a),p,m is the easy knapsack. The knapsack is said easy if {a} is a 
superincreasing sequence, 
i - i 
cLj > Y^ ai. 
i=i 
To generate the public key, we can first start from the private key {a } . The 
public key (hard knapsack) {a'} will be 
a- = di X p (mod m) 1 < i < n, 
where m > E L i «i and gcd{p, m) 二 1 (1 < i < n). 
To encrypt a message with the public key {a'}, {6} will be the message block, 
so that the value of bi will decide whether a'- is selected and the ciphertext is S. 
To decrypt the message, compute 
n 
s' 二 p—i X S (mod m) p~^ x ^ ka- (mod m) 
•^=1 
n n 
=P—1 X J2 H^i X P) ( m � d m) 二 Y^ hai (mod m), 
i=i 2.=1 
and the solution of these easy knapsack S' will be the plaintext. To solve the easy 
knapsack given S' and {a } , first compare a^ and S'. If a^ > S', it means that 
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bn 二 0 and proceed to a^_i. Otherwise K = 1, then set S' 二 S' — an and compare 
with an-i to determine hn-i. Repeat the procedure and the sequence (message 
block) {b} can be found. It is found that the original knapsack algorithm was 
broken and many variant of knapsack algorithms have been proposed but some 
of them have also been broken [34 . 
8.3.3 RSA 
The RSA cryptosystem is one of the most widely used public key cryptosystem 
nowadays. The system was first introduced by R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir and L. 
M. Adleman in 1978[35]. To generate the encryption and decryption keys, first 
generate two large random primes p and q and compute n 二 pq. Then generate 
a random integer e such that gcd{e, ^{n)) = 1 {^{n) = {p — 1) X (q — 1)). The 
numbers n and e are the encryption keys and made public. The decryption key 
d is defined as the inverse of e (mod <^(n)), i.e. e x d = 1 (mod ^{n)). The 
decryption key d and the primes p, q are kept secret. 
To encrypt a message, first breaks the message into many integer blocks Mi 
such that the value of each block is between 0 and n — 1. The ciphertext Ci is, 
a = E{Mi) = Ml (mod n) 
To decrypt the ciphertext, 
M, = D{Ci) = Cf (mod n) 
The theory behind RSA is based on Fermat,s Little theorem, i f p i s a prime and 
does not divide M, then M" 二 1 (mod p). Since e x d 三 1 (mod <^(n)), 
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therefore e x d = k(f>{n) + 1 for some integer k. From Fermat's Little theorem, 
Mfc< (^n)+i 三 M[%-i)]x(P-i)+i 三 M (mod p) 
三 7^[Mp-i)]x(g-i)+i 三 M (mod q) 
From these two equations, it implies that for some integers r,<s, 
M/c0(n)+i = M + rp 二 M + sq. 
Since p, q are primes, so r = tq and 5 = tp for some integer t. Therefore, 
|fc<Mn)+i = M + tpq = M (mod n), 
and for all Mi, 0 < Mi < n, 
Mfxd (mod n)三 Mf^(")+i (mod n)三 Mi (mod n) 
i 
8.3.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem 
An elliptic curve over Z^^ and gcd[n, 6) 二 1 is defined by, 
E : y2 = x^ + ax + 6, 
where a and b are integers and gcd{ia^ + 27b^,n) = 1. The points of E includes 
the solutions {x, y) G 2^ n x Z^ and a point 0 called the point at infinity. 
For points P 二 {x^,yi) G E and Q = {x2,y2) G E. If Q = -P = {xi,-y^), 
then P + Q 二 C>. Moreover, 0 + P = P + 0 = P, which means that 0 is the 
identity element If Q + —P, then P + Q 二 (2；3，灼)with 
\2 f M l i f P M a^ 3 二 A" - Xi - X2 X2 - a;i 
and A = 3 4 + a 
y3 = 乂冗1—工3)一"1， 2 ^ 1 ， i t r = V . 
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The points on E over a finite field K form an abelian group and the addition 
operations involve are simple and easy to implement. The elliptic curve loga-
rithm problem is believed to be harder that the discrete logarithm problem in 
finite field of the same size of K. In 1985, N. Koblitz and V. Miller proposed 
the use of elliptic curve to public key cryptosystem. Elliptic curves over finite 
fields can be used to implement existing algorithms like the Elgamal, Schnorr 
and Digital Signature Standard [36 . 
i I 
8.3.5 Public Key vs. Private Key Cryptosystem 
As described above, the two main advantages of public key cryptosystem is 
that they provide better key management and distribution, and a new way of 
authentication - digital signature. However, one main drawback of public key 
is that they are slower than private key cryptosystems because of the complex 
computation involved like modular arithmetic and prime number generation. In 
fact, we can use public key cryptosystems for key exchange and distribution, and 
authentication. Meanwhile, use private key cryptosystems for data encryption 
and decryption to obtain the best performance. Therefore, it maybe difficult 
and unfair to compare them based on the security, since it greatly depends on 
the key length [18, 32 . 
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8.4 Digital Signature 
Signature is a very important means for validation in business world. In order to 
use digital signature in electronic document like written signature for paper 
document, we need algorithms to verify the authenticity of a message. The 
digital signature should be able to be verified by anyone and cannot be forged. 
Moreover, the signer cannot deny that his has signed the message. Nevertheless, 
digital signature is different from written signature that it varies for different 
document, otherwise, the signature can be attached to any message. In private 
key cryptosystem, authentication is not easy to achieved, this problem can be 
solved by using public key cryptosystem [35 . 
Suppose user A wants to sign a message M to user B, A first uses his private 
key to sign (decrypt) the message to S = ^4(M") and sends it to B. When B 
received the signature S, he looks up A’s public key and verifies (encrypts) S by 
this encryption key, EA{S) = EU(L>A(M)) = M. In this way, A cannnot deny 
the signature since only he knows the private key. Also, B can verify that A 
signed the message M and he cannot modify M since it is difficult for him to 
create another message M' + M such that DA{M') = S. 
However, this simple protocol may have some problems : (i) The file con-
taining A，s public key may be tampered and so the verification of A，s signature 
with the wrong public key will become meaningless, (ii) If A，s private key is 
compromised and made public (either accidentally or intentionally), then any-
one can pretend A to sign message using A's key and A has to respond for these 
signed message, (iii) B is able to copy this signed document and reuse it [33 . 
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The first problem can be solved by authenticating the public key by a trusted 
third party called the Central Authority (CA). The CA issues certificates CU 
for A containing A's identity and public key all signed by the CA's private key. 
B can obtain A's certificate and compute the contents using the public key of 
the CA. The second and the third problem can be solved by using a timestamp. 
A timekeeper will timestamp the message M by signing M and the current time 
with timekeeper's private key. B can ask the CA for the validity of A's public 
key based on the timestamp. If A lost his private key, he can report the CA for 
the lost so only message with timestamp before A's report are still valid. 
Some popular digital signature scheme based on public key cryptosystem in-
clude the ElGamal Signature scheme and the Digital Signature Standard. 
8.4.1 ElGamal Signature Scheme 
The ElGamal public key and signature scheme was proposed by T. El-
Gamal in 1985 based on discrete exponentiation. Using this signature scheme, 
to generate the signature for a message M, first select a large prime p. Then 
generate a random integer k such that gcd{k,p) 二 1 and choose an element 
a G Z;. Compute m 二 H[M) {H is an one-way hashing function) and r 二 a& 
(mod p). Finally, solve for 5 in equation, 
m == ar + ks (mod p — 1) 
s = (m — ar)k_i (mod p — 1). 
The pair {r,s) will be the signature for message M. The private key will be a 
and the public keys are a, a® and the prime p. 
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To verify the signature (r, s) of the message M, first compute, 
^ 
-¾ 
I ^s ^ ar ^ ks ^  ar ^ ar^ks /^^J 们、 
j r a — a a — a (^ moa p). 
j Then compute and validate if a^ 二 rScT^ (mod p) [18，36 . 
1 
j 8.4.2 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 'i t 
j The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) is first proposed by the U.S. National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in August, 1991. Using DSS, to 
sign a message M, first select a large prime p where 2^ ^^  < p < 2^ ^^  and a prime 
divisor q of p - 1 with 2^ ^^  < q < 2^ ®°. Then generate a random integer k with 
0 < k < q and choose an element g G ^* of order q. Select the private key x with 
I 0 < X < q and compute the public key y 二 g^ (mod p). Compute m = H{M) 
i 
I (H : M — Z is an one-way hashing function) and r = ( / (mod p)) (mod q). 
i 
I Finally, solve for s in equation, 
I m — —xr + ks (mod q) 
s 二 (m + xr)k~^ (mod q). 
The pair (r, s) will be the signature for message M and the public keys are p, g, 
g and y. 
To verify the signature (r, 5) of the message M , first compute, 
w 二 s_i (mod q), Ui = mw (mod q) and U2 rw (mod q). 
Then compute and validate if r 二 [ g � ^ ) (mod p)) (mod q). The process of 
the verification is that, 
k = mw + xrw (mod q) = ui + xu2 (mod q). 
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Therefore, 
("、以2 (mod p)) (mod q) 二 {g^'g"^' (mod p)) (mod q) 
= { g ^ (mod p)) (mod q) = r 
Just like Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the security of the ElGamal and DSS 
signature scheme are also based on the difficulty of discrete logarithm. Compar-
ing with ElGamal signature for the same value of p，the size of DSS signature 
which depends on q (order of a subgroup of Z^) is smaller [18, 36 . 
8.5 Cryptanalysis to Current Cryptosystems 
8.5.1 Differential Cryptanalysis 
A well-known cryptanalysis to DES and some DES-like cryptosystems is differ-
ential cryptanalysis developed by E. Biham and A. Shamir [37, 38]. It is a 
chosen-plaintext attack that uses 2^ ® ciphertexts to compute the key instead of 
2^ 5 complexity brute force attack for 16 round DES. These ciphertexts are se-
lected from 247 chosen plaintexts by a simple bit repetition criteria. This scheme 
can also work even the selected ciphertexts are computed from different keys. 
In this attack, the initial permutation IP and final permutation IP—i of 
DES are ignored since they have no effect on cryptanalysis. The basic idea 
of differential cryptanalysis is to analyse the relation between the differences 
(^XOR for DES-like cryptosystems) in plaintext pairs and the differences of their 
corresponding ciphertext pairs. The differences will then be used to estimate 
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the most probable key. 
In DES, when a particular XOR value of two plaintexts are modified simulta-
neously, the particular XOR value of intermediate round will be modified in cer-
tain way with relatively high probability (two such encryptions are called a pair). 
The XOR of pairs is linear in operations of EP, P and Ri 二 Li-i © f[Ri-i,Ki). 
Moreover, the nonlinear S-box in DES provides a probabilistic distribution of 
possible output XORs for each input XOR of which many output XORs have a 
relatively high probability. Based on this property and a pair of chosen cipher-
texts, a set of possible subkeys Ki for the function f in the last round can be 
found. Moreover, the input and output XOR of the function f and each S-box 
in the last round can also be found. With only few pairs, most subkey values 
can be estimated [37 . ‘ 
Differential cryptanalysis can also be used to other DES-like cryptosystems. 
For example, the Lucifier with eight rounds can be broken within 60 ciphertexts 
and the Feal-8 can be broken within 1000 pairs of ciphertexts. 
8.5.2 An Attack to RC4 in Netscapel.l 
The idea of the attack to RC4 in Netscapel.l is based on the insecure of random 
number generator used by Netscapel.l. The session key can be determined in 
25 seconds and this attack also work for 128-bit version [H]. This attack was 
proposed by two graduate students at the University of California at Berkeley, 
and published on the Internet in Sep 1995. [I]. Their idea is that Netscape 
uses a combination of the time seconds and mircoseconds, the process ID and 
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\ 
j the parent process ID to seed the random number generator. They proposed 
that approximated values can be determined, for example, from time network 
\ daemon and mail daemon. Appropriate guessing of these values may reduce the 
expected search to less than brute-force. 
According to Netscape's response, this vulnerability exists because the size 
1 • 
of random input is less than the size of the subsequent keys. Hence a brute 
I force search of a smaller key space is needed instead of all the 2^ s^ possible keys. 
They claimed that the problem have already been fixed and they planned to 
increase the random information from about 30 bits to about 300 bits. Moreover, 
they said that this discovery does not affect the security of SSL, RC4 or other 
Netscape's security implementations [J . 
. . 
！ However, Community ConneXion criticized Netscape's response that it is 
j inappropriate for Netscape to say that they use random information to generate 
{ 
\ 
I session encryption keys since these information increases sequentially at a known 
) 
I or predictable rates. Furthermore, they said that the vulnerability exists is not 
due to the size of random input. In fact, the security flaw because the initial 
I - • 
input to the algorithm is not random. The fact that the size of the non-random 
input is less than the subsequent keys is another factor that lowered Netscape's 
security [H . 
Though Netscape has increased randomness in their new version of browser, 
from this attack, we can know how important the randomness of a key is. 
j 
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• 
8.5.3 An Timing Attack to Diffie-Hellman, RSA 
According to [K], cryptanalysts can use time measurement of cryptographic 
operations to reveal key materials since it is hard to software implement an 
algorithm that run in fixed time. It means that for different inputs, the process 
1 time may also different. They can use known ciphertext attack with timing 
measurements to find out the secret exponent of Difl&e-Hellman system, factor 
RSA keys n and so on. 
1. Fixed exponent Diffie-Hellman - Timing measurement can be used to find 
the secret exponent x that uses for multiple Diffie-Hellman key exchange. 
Suppose the opponent has the knowledge of values n, a and the general 
design of the target system. Then he can measure the time to compute 
X = a^ (mod n) over several operations. In the modular multiplication, 
if a bit Xi is 1, the intermediate step y 二 y x a (mod n) is computed. 
Otherwise, this step will be skipped. This time difference can be used to 
estimate the bit Xi. 
2. Factoring RSA private key - For the RSA operation M = C^ (mod n) not 
using Chinese Remainder Theorem, the same attack as for Diffie-Hellman 
can be applied here. In Chinese Remainder Theorem, C (mod p) and C 
(mod q) are first computed which do not run in constant time. The known 
ciphertext attack is to choose values of C close to p (or q) and measure 
I 
the time to compute C (mod p). If C < p, there is not effect to compute 
C (mod p), if C is slightly greater than p, C (mod p) = C - p. 
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Figure 8.2: The Encryption and Decryption algorithm of IDEA 
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Network Security and 
Electronic Commerce 
9.1 Network Security 
9.1.1 Password 
One very important thing in network security is password. A password is 
used to inform the network system about the identity of the user. Therefore, 
the selection of the password greatly affects the security of users and networks. 
Some selection of password that should prevent [18, 39]: 
1. Use the username, account name, phone number, birthday or similar in-
formation of relevant person. 
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2. Use words from different databases. For example, use words in English 
or foreign dictionary, names of place, proper noun, string of same letter, 
special keyboard patterns like "qwert" and so on. 
3. Use letter permutation, capitalization or word pluralization to the words 
obtained from the first two steps. 
4. Use the same password over many different accounts. 
Meanwhile, here are some suggestions to select and use passwords [39]: 
1. Use digits, punctuation characters with uppercase and lowercase letters. 
2. Use password which is easy to remember but dimcult to guess. For exam-
ple, combined two or three short words separated by digit and punctuation 
character, use some special acronym of a long phrase. 
‘ 3. Change the password frequently like once every few months. Hence even 
the password is learnt by someone, it will change after a certain time. 
SecurID 
The SecurID is a user identification and authentication system developed by 
the Security Dynamics Technologies, Inc. Security Dynamics was founded in 
1984, and is going to acquire RSA for their security products. This system uses 
two levels of authentication, (i) the tradition reusable password or the personal 
identification number (PIN) and (ii) an access control security token called the 
SecurID token. 
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With Security Dynamics' access control modules (ACMs), the SecurID to-
ken generates an one-time-only, unique and unpredictable access code every 60 
seconds. This code will be displayed on the SecurID token so that only those 
who has the token can gain access. The SecurID token will synchronize with a 
hardware or software ACM. To access a computer, a user first enters his secret 
PIN and then the displayed code on the SecurID token. Authentication is done 
if both the unique PIN and the token's code are matched [L . 
Smart Card 
A smart card is a tamper-resistant plastic card that stores and protects secure 
information on an embedded intergrated microprocessor chip. There are two 
main types of smart cards, (i) an "intelligent" smart card with CPU, it has 
read, write and decision making ability, so new information can be added and 
processed and (ii) a memory card which mainly for information storage like the 
stored value a user can spend. 
The intelligence of the IC chip can protect the stored information from attack. 
Hence smart cards are more secure than tradition magnetic stripe cards that 
store information outside the card and easier to be copied. Moreover, a smart 
card can use a secret key such as PIN to match the access code like that for 
ATM card. Smart cards can be used for secure access to networks, storage of 
secret keys, digital signatures and electronic cash [M . 
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9.1.2 Network Firewalls 
One common technology today for Internet security is the use of firewalls. A 
firewall can be considered as a intermediate system between the Internet and a 
trusted network. It acts as a filter that only permits authorized information to 
throw into or out of the network [22]. A firewall can be implemented by setting 
up routers, computers or hosts to protect the local network from unwanted 
connections or information outside the network [40, N . 
Without firewall, the security of the network may only rely on the host 
security. A firewall can filter out some insecure services like NFS or NIS and 
attack from hosts outside the protected network. Besides, a firewall can enforce 
a network access policy by controlling the access to the network such that a host 
can be made unreachable from unwanted access outside the network. Moreover, 
a firewall can protect some Domain Name Server (DNS) information like IP 
addresses and names. Also, it can provide log and statistics about network 
access and usage to monitor the network. 
Though firewall has several advantages, there are still some potential prob-
lems. Firstly, firewall cannot provide security within the network. Besides, it 
cannot prevent the transfer of virus-infected files into or out of the network. 
Moreover, as the security of the network is concentrated in the firewall, any 
problems or flaws in the firewall will substantially affect the entire network. 
Since all connections must be filtered by the firewall, it can also be a bottleneck 
of the network and limits the throughput [N . 
The firewall system use two levels of network policy (the network access 
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policy and the service access policy) to define the services allowed and denied 
for the network. The main components to implement these policies include : 
Packet-filtering routers 
A packet-filtering router filters IP packets during input and/or output time 
based on their source or destination IP addresses, or in some routers, the source 
or destination TCP/UDP ports. A packet-filtering router can block the connec-
tions to or from certain hosts, networks or ports. Moreover, it can control the 
kind of services that are accessible by other hosts. For example, a site may allow 
any hosts to use SMTP but allow only one Telnet connection to a host. Some 
services which are inherently dangerous are usually blocked by the firewall to or 
from any hosts. Besides, for those services which are less risky, the firewalls will 
restrict the access to only certain systems. 
There are some problems using packet-filtering routers, firstly, the ruleset is 
complex especially when exceptions to rules are required for certain services. If 
the routers do not filter on the TCP/UDP source port, the ruleset may become 
even more complex. Secondly, some services use random port numbers, they , 
include tcpmux protocol and portmappernsed by RPC. The router cannot block 
these services unless it blocks all possible ports, however, it would also block 
some desired services [40 • 
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Application-level gateways 
An application gateway is a host that uses an application called a proxy 
service to forward and filter connections for services like Telnet and FTP. Using 
proxy services, only those services with a proxy can go through the application 
gateway. For example, if the application gateway contains proxies for FTP and 
SMTP, then all services except FTP and SMTP are blocked. Besides, using 
proxy services, the protocol can be filtered. 
Moreover, security can increase by logging and authenticate the connection. 
Application gateways can be used together with other gateways like packet fil-
tering routers and circuit-level gateways to increase flexibility and security. The 
filtering rules will become less complex than the packet filtering router [40 • 
Circuit-level gateways 
It is sometimes considered as a kind of application gateway. Circuit gateways 
relay TCP connections, the source host connects to a TCP port on the gateway 
and connects to the destination on the other side. Using circuit gateways, once 
the connection between the source and the destination is setup, the gateway 
will just act as a wire that passes the information between the two hosts. The 
gateways can monitor and control the connection by logging (like number of 
bytes flow and TCP destination), limit the duration of the connection, maintain 
a list of allowable external hosts and so on [40 . 
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9.2 Implementation for Network Security 
9.2.1 Kerberos 
Kerberos is a trusted third-party authentication protocol based on Needham 
and Schroeder's protocol and later modified by Denning and Sacco. The orig-
inal work is done by Project Athena and the Massachusetts Institute Technol-
ogy (MIT). Kerberos provides verification of the identities on an open network | 
without relying on the authentication of host operating system, addresses and 
physical security [0]. 
The authentication process includes: 
1. A client sends request to the authentication server (AS) for a credential 
of a given server. The credential includes a ticket of the server and a 
session key. There are two approaches, using the first method, a client 
sends a request for a ticktet-granting ticket (TGT) for later use with the 
ticket-granting server (TGS). The second method is that the client sends 
i 
the request to the TGS. ‘ 
2. For the first approach, the AS responds by the client's key (derived from 
the password) encrypted credentials. For the second approach, the re-
sponds is encrypted by the session key from the TGT. The ticket has 
the client's identity, session key, a timestamp and other information all 
encrypted by the server's secret key. 
3. The client sends the ticket to the server to verify the identities. An addition 
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information called authenticator is used to prove the message is sent by 
the client/server to whom the ticket was issued. This authenticator is 
encrypted by session key with a timestamp. 
4. The session key is used to authenticate the client and optional the server 
and can also be used to ensure the integrity and privacy of the message 
exchanged. The session key is temporary used within a single login session. 
The encryption system is Data Encryption Standard (DES) in Cipher Block 
Chaining (CBC) mode with a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC-32), MD4 or 
MD5 checksum to the message sequence. In CBC mode, initialization vector 
(IV) of zero is used. 
9.2.2 Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) 
Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) is developed by the Privacy and Security 
Research Group (PSRG) of the Internet Resources Task Force (IRTF) and the 
PEM Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). PEM 
provides privacy enhancement services like authentication and message integrity , 
for electronic mail transfer over the Internet [P . 
PEM uses two-level keying hierarchy for encryption: 
1. Data Encrypting Key (DEK) - for encryption of message text and com-
putation of Message Integrity Check (MIC). Wlien using public key, 
it is also used for encryption of signed representation of MIC in a PEM 
message. 
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2. Interchange Key (IK) - for encryption of DEKs. When using private key, 
the IK is the private key shared between the sender and the receiver. When 
using public key, the IK component for DEK encryption is the public key 
of the receiver whereas the component for MIC encryption is the private 
key of the sender. 
The plaintext message is first accepted in local form and then converted to 
a canonical message defined as equivalent to the SMTP representation. This 
canonical form will be used for MIC computation and encryption if required. 
The output is then combined with a header containing the cryptographic con-
trol information. The output PEM message is sent as the text portion to the 
electronic mail system for transmission. When the message is received, the infor-
mation in the header is used for MIC validation and decryption. The canonical 
output is converted to local form. 
Moreover, the algorithms and modes used by PEM mainly include [Q]: 
1. Message Encryption algorithms - DES with cipher block chaining (DES-
CBC) for encryption of message text and signature (using public key). 
2. Message Integrity Check algorithms - use MD2 and MD5 message digest. 
3. Symmetric Key Management algorithms - DES in Electronic Codebook 
(DES-ECB) mode and DES in Encrypt-Decrypt-Encrypt (DES-EDE) mode 
with pairs of key for encryption of DEK and MIC. 
4. Asymmetric Key Management algorithms - RSA is used for encryption 
of DEK and MIC, and RSA with MD2 is used to sign certificates and 
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certificate revocation list (CRL). 
9.2.3 Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 
Pretty Good(tm) Privacy (PGP) is developed by P. Zimmermannfrom Phil's 
Pretty Good Software. PGP uses public key encryption for people to exchange 
messages with privacy, authentication and convenience [41]. PGP uses RSA 
public key with IDEA private key encryption, MD5 message digest for digital 
signatures and data compression before encryption. 
To protect the secret even it is known by someone else, PGP asks for a pass 
phrase before one can access the private key file. The pass phrase can be a 
whole phrase or sentence which is like a password. The generation of the public 
and private key is based on random numbers derived mainly from measuring 
intervals between keystrokes using a fast timer. Public keys are kept in key 
certificates with user ID, key generation timestamp and the key. The public 
and private key rings contains one or more of these key certificates. In this way, 
instead of keeping keys in separate key files, the use of key rings facilitates the 
automatic lookup of keys by user ID or key ID (an abbreviation of the public 
key for internally reference of the key). 
Encrypted files are prefixed by the key ID of the public encryption key and 
the receiver can use it to look up for the private decryption key. Signed document 
are prefixed by the signature certificates containing the key ID of the signed key, 
signed message digest of the document and the timestamp of signature creation 
time. The receiver can use the key ID to look up the sender's public key for 
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signature verification. 
The confidence of ones public key can be improved by keeping the public 
key with a collection of introducers'ceiiiiymg signatures. One can become an 
introducer by signing someone public key and return it with his signature. PGP 
keeps tracks of the keys on the public key ring that are certified with signatures 
from a trusted introducers. When PGP validating a public key, it examines 
the trust level of the certifying signatures and computes the weighted score of 
validity, for example two marginally trust signatures may be considered as a 
trusted signature. 
9.3 Internet Commerce 
The advantages of Internet commerce includes [42]: 
1. Information update in Internet is more efficient and less expensive since 
the merchants do not need to reprint and redistribute the information. 
2. Less printing and distribution cost of sending information or advertisement 
through Internet than tradition method by printed catalog or mail. 
3. Environmental protection because of less consumption of paper. 
4. The merchant can promote their products no only by means of printed 
matter, but also other media like audio or video. 
5. Interactive service between the consumers and merchants. The consumers 
can send feedback or purchase order through on-line Internet service. 
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Meanwhile, to provide a better environment for Internet commerce, here are 
some desired requirements for Internet commerce system [APJ: 
1. Security and Reliability - since Internet is an open environment, a payment 
system which involves transfer of money and private information must be 
secure and reliable. In electronic cash system, illegal creation, copying or 
double spending of electronic cash should be prevented or detected. 
2. Scalability - as the growth of Internet is rapid, the payment system should 
be able to handle the increment of consumers and merchants without sig-
nificant performance degradation. 
3. Anonymity - in some transactions, the identity of the parties participate 
should be untraceable. 
4. Acceptability - the payment systems should be supported by multiple servers | 
and banks so that transactions between users of different servers or banks 
become possible. 
5. Flexibility - the payment systems is desired to support different payment 
methods analogous to credit cards, cheques and paper cash. ‘ 
6. Transferablity - a user can spend electronic cash with a third party without 
first connecting to the cash server. 
7. Interoperability and Convertibility - since there exists several methods of 
payment in the Internet, the funds in one system should be convertible 
into funds in other systems. 
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9.3.1 Electronic Cash 
Some common payment methods for Internet commerce includes credit card 
payment and electronic cheque. However, these services are non-anonymous and 
the identity of the parties of the transaction are not protected. Electronic cash 
is a new concept of payment, the users can use electronic cash for transaction 
like paper cash in which their identity are anonymous and untraceable. This 
concept is based on bl ind signatures proposed by D. Chaum. A user can 
blind a document and ask for a digital signature, the signer will have no idea 
about the identity of the sender. 
Blind Signature 
i 
The concept of blind signature is first proposed by D. Chaum in [43]. Suppose 丨 
a user A requests another user B to sign a document x without knowing the 
content of the document. Use blind signature protocol A first generates a random 
value r called the blind factor, and uses r to compute a commuting function c{x) 
and sends to B. Then B signs c{x) by the private key and return Ds{c{x)) to A. 
A retrieves Bs(x) by applying c - ' (Bs ( c ( x ) ) ) = Bs(x) and verifies the signature 
by B's public key and checks if Es{Ds{x)) 二 x. The commuting function and its 
inverse are only known to A and the signing function deploys digital signature 
scheme based on public key cryptography. 
Since the signer B does not know the content of the document he signs, 
there is a risk that A may cheat B by sending a document which is adverse to 
B. There is a technique to prevent A from cheating B. First A make n copies 
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of the document and each is blinded with a different blinding factor. A sends 
all these documents to B. B randomly chooses n — 1 of them and asks A for 
the blinding factors for these documents. B extracts the documents using the 
received blinding factors and checks if all these n — 1 documents are correct. 
If yes, B signs the document remained and returns to A. In this way, the 
probability that A can cheat B is much smaller and can be reduced by a larger 
n [18；. 
The blind signature protocol can be applied to construct a untraceable pay-
ment system. Suppose a user A requests the bank to sign a electronic note x 
with anonymity and uses the note for electronic payment, the procedures are 
AD]: 
1. A generates a random blinding factor r and computes c{x) 二 xr^ (mod pq) 
and sends to the bank. The parameters e is the bank's private key, p and ‘ 
q are two large prime numbers, they are generated and used in the same 
way as in RSA public key cryptosystem. 
! 
2. The bank signs the note with {xr'Y = rx^ (mod pq), return the signed 
note to A and debits A 5^ account. The bank cannot determine x since the 
value of the blinding factor r is not known. 
3. A retrieves the signed note by c"i(rx^) = (rx^)/r = x^ (mod pq). Then 
A verifies the note by the bank's public key e and checks if (x^^ = a: 
(mod pq) and stores x^ (mod pq) if valid. 
4. When A decides to pay, he sends x^ (mod pq) to the merchant. 
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5. The merchant verifies the note and forwards to the bank if valid. 
6. The bank verifies the note and checks if the note is already on the list of 
cleared notes. If the checking are correct, the bank credits the merchant's 
account and informs the merchant. 
9.4 Internet Browsers 
9.4.1 Secure NCSA Mosaic 
N C S A M o s a i c is one of the earliest Internet information browser and World 
Wide Web ( W W W ) client. NCSA Mosaic was developed at the National Cen-
ter for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois in 
Urbana-Champaign. Secure N C S A Mosa i c with security enchanced version 
developed by NCSA with Enterprise Integration Technologies (EIT) and RSA 
Data Security Inc. (RSADSI) [R]. Through the implementation of Secure H y -
p e r T e x t Transfer P r o t o c o l (S-HTTP), authentication, privacy, certificate 
and key management are provided. 
Secure NCSA Mosaic uses RSA for key exchange between client and server 
and generates RSA key pairs from 512 to 1024 bits and public key certificate. 
A user can also obtain public key certificates from Public Certificate Issuing 
丨 Agency and he can digitally sign and verify messages to and from the server. 
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Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol (S -HTTP) 
Users can securely communicate with servers using Secure HTTP Uniform Re-
source Locator (URL) shttp instead of http. So the users should use "shttp://，， 
to connect to a secure servers or just use "http : / / " for non-secure W W W like 
NCSA Mosaic. S-HTTP supports end-to-end secure transaction and allows the 
server and the client to negotiate a wide range of operation modes, encapsulation 
formats, key management, encryption and signature algorithms. 
In S-HTTP, message is protected by : (i) signature (ii) encryption - with 
two key exchange algorithms, by puhlic key inhand key exchange or externally 
arranged keys and (iii) authentication - verify message integrity and sender au-
thenticity through the computation of a Message Authentication Code, a keyed 
hash over the document [S]. The negotiation parameters for S-HTTP are: 
1. Privacy Domain types - PKCS-7, PEM and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). 
2. Certificate types - the types of Public Key Certificate that the agent will 
accept which include X.509 and PKCS-6. 
3. Key Exchange algorithms - RSA, Outband (certain external key agree-
ment), Inband (direct assignment of an uncovered key to a symbolic name) 
and Kerberos. 
4. Digital Signature algorithms - RSA and NIST-DSS. 
5. Message Digest algorithms - MD2, MD5 and NIST-SHS. 
6. Private Key algorithms for message - DES, IDEA, RC2, RC4 and CDMF. 
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7. PrMe Key algorithms for header - DES, IDEA, RC2 and CDMF. 
8. Prhmcy Enchancements - indicate whether a message is signed, encrypted 
or authenticated. 
9.4.2 Netscape Navigator 
Netscape Navigator is one of most popular commercial network navigator 
developed by Netscape Communications. They also developed another product 
called Netscape Commerce Server to provide secure electronic commerce and 
communications services over Internet and other TCP/IP-based network [T . 
Netscape Communications has designed a security protocol called Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL) to provide data security layered between TCP/IP and 
application protocols like HTTP, Telnet, NNTP, or FTP [U, V]. Users can 
connect to secure HTTP servers using SSL by a new URL access method https 
instead of http. So "https:/ /" should be used when connecting to HTTP URLs 
with SSL or just use "http: / / " as before for HTTP URLs without SSL. The 
cryptographic technologies of Netscape Navigator are mainly developed by RSA 
Data Security Inc. They use 128-bit key size RC4 stream encryption algorithm 
within U.S. and a 40-bit key size version is approved for export to most countries. 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol is a two-layer Internet security protocol 
.W]. The lower layer {SSL Record Protocol) layered above a reliable transport 
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protocol like TCP/IP for encapsulation of various higher level protocols. Before 
data transmission, user can first use SSL Handshake Protocol to negotiate the 
desired encryption algorithm and session key and SSL can also provide server 
and client authentication. Thereafter, any data exchange between application 
protocols will be encrypted and decrypted by SSL. Different application proto-
cols can then be layered on top of SSL Protocol transparently. 
The SSL protocol can provides channel security in three aspects [T, X], 
1. After the private key is negotiated by initial handshake, all data will be 
encrypted by private key cryptography (like DES, RC4). 
2. The server and client identity are authenticated. A client can verify the 
identity of a server using certificate and digital signature. The authenti-
cation process is done by public key cryptography. 
3. The data transport includes a data integrity check using a MAC by secure 
hash functions (like SHA, MD5). 
The main process of SSL Handshake protocol is, 
1. The client sends a client hello message to the server and the server should 
respond with a server hello message. This message exchange defines the 
client/server version, session ID, cipher suite and compression method. 
2. The server will send its certificate if it is to be authenticated. The server 
key exchange message may be sent if required. 
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3. The client must send either certificate message or a no certificate alert if a 
certificate request is received. Based on the public key algorithm selected 
during the exchange of hello messages, the client key exchange message 
(RSA, Diffie-Hellman or Fortezza-KEA) is sent. 
4. A certificate verify message may be sent to verify the certificate. 
5. The client sends a change cipher spec message and the finished message 
based on the new algorithm, keys and secrets. 
6. The server responds by sending its change cipher spec message and then 
sends its finished message. The handshake is now completed and applica-
tion layer data can start exchange between the client and the server. 
9.4.3 SunSoft HotJava 
The HotJava browser is a new Internet navigator developed by Sun Microsys-
tems, the main feature of HotJava is the interactive services. The users can 
access application softwares dynamically without installing them, which means 
that the softwares are transparently migrated over the network. The uses of 
HotJava's dynamic services includes [Y]: 
1. Interactive Content 
2. Dynamic Types - can understand different types of objects through dy-
namically link the Java code from the host to support the object. 
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3. Dynamic Protocols - uses protocol name to link appropriate handlers in-
stead of built-in protocol handlers, so new protocols can be incorporated 
dynamically. 
The reason that HotJava can provide these dynamic capabilities is that Hot-
Java is written in a new language called Java(tm). Java is a dynamic and 
object-oriented language which is close to C + + . Moreover, as Java is used in 
distributed environment like Internet, security is important. Java can be used to 
construct a virus-free and tamper-free system and it uses public-key encryption 
for authentication [Z]. 
Security of HotJava 
Using HotJava, code fragments are capable to import, install and execute over 
the Internet transparently. Hence, security problem is significant to HotJava 
and it has four layers of interlocking facilities to provide secruity [AA]: 
1. The Java language and compiler - Pointer arithmetic and modification are 
not allowed in Java. Java uses true arrays instead of pointer arithmetic. 
2. Verification of bytecode - Verification is needed to clarify if the import code 
fragments come from a trustworthy compiler. The import code cannot 
executed before it has passed verifier's test and after the verification : 
(a) There are no operand stack overflows or underflows. 
(b) The types of the parameters to all opcodes are correct. 
(c) There are no illegal data conversions. 
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(d) All object field accesses are legal. 
Therefore, using HotJava, a private variable can be trusted as really pri-
vate. Moreover, file access and the ability of applets to grab files and throw 
over firewalls are also restricted. 
3. The Class loader - The thread of execution running Java bytecode can be 
considered as a set of classes partitiion into namespaces. The class loader 
guarantees that unique namespace exists for built-in class (class from the 
local file system) and each network source. To prevent an imported class 
to affect a built-in class, the runtime system first checks the class in the 
built-in's namespace and then the referencing class's namespace. 
4. Interface-specific security - The security of the first three lower levels en-
able all local classes protected from modification by imported code. To 
network level, HotJava uses mechanisms to provide information about the 
trustworthiness of imported code. For example, it can check whether the 
origin of the code is inside or outside a firewall or in future uses public key 




Examples of Electronic 
Commerce System 
Current electronic payment methods in Internet include [AP]: 
1. Electronic Cash - has main advantage of its anonymity but the main prob-
lem is the requirement of a large database to track past transactions so as 
to prevent double spending. Current electronic cash-based systems include 
DigiCash and USC-ISI's NetCash. 
2. Credit-debit model - it includes First Virtual, NetBill and USC-ISI's 
NetCheque. Consumers are registered with accounts on commerce server 
and debit the account for the payment. This model has an advantage of 
auditability, therefore, it is not typically anonymous. 
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3. Secure Credit Card - the model in which the consumers only need the credit 
card numbers and do not need to be registered with the payment system. 
The consumers' credit card numbers and purchased amount are encrypted 
by public key such that only the merchants or the payment processing 
service can read them. 
10.1 CyberCash 
CyberCash, Inc. was founded in August 1994 by B. Melton, D. Lynch, S. 
Crocker, M. Yesil and B. Wilson to provide a secure and convenient electronic 
payment system over the Internet. With the CyberCash Secure Internet Pay-
ment System, secure transactions on the Internet between consumers, merchants 
and their banks are done. CyberCash claimed that they are the only company 
with world-wide export license of 768-bit RSA encryption algorithm. They also 
use 56-bit DES for encryption and all transactions are authenticated using MD5 
with 768-bit RSA signatures. CyberCash transactions are transferred over three 
separate softwares located at the consumer's PC (called a wallet), the merchant's 
server and the CyberCash servers [AB . 
Credit Card and Money Payment 
CyberCash provides both secure credit card and money payments services on 
the Internet. The main procedure of Secure Internet Credit Card Payment 
is shown in Figure 10.1 [AC]: 
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Figure 10.1: CyberCash Secure Internet Credit Card Payment 
； 1. The consumer goes to a merchant's site and selects the goods or services 
\ he wants to purchase. Then the merchant server returns a summary of the 
items like the price and transaction ID to the consumer. 
2. When the consumer is ready to pay, he chooses a "wallet" and which 
credit card from their "wallet" to pay. Then he can forward the order and 
encrypted payment information to the merchant. 
3. The merchant extracts the order part, digitally signed and encrypt the 
encrypted payment information by his private key and forwards to the 
CyberCash server. 
4. CyberCash server examines the -received information and forwards to the 
merchant's bank over dedicated lines. 
5. The merchant's bank forwards the credit card authorization data to the 
cardholder's bank through the card association and returns the approval 
or denial code back to the CyberCash server. 
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6. CyberCash server returns an electronic receipt with the approval or denial 
code to the merchant and forwards to the consumer and complete the 
transaction. These procedure can be completed with one minute. 
Besides credit card payment, a consumer can also pay by cash using Cy-
berCash Money Payments Service, he can make a payment through e-mail 
over the Internet. Payments are peer-to-peer and virtually instantaneous with a 
digitally signed receipt to confirm the transaction. Moreover, with CyberCash 
MiniPayments，a consumer can make small payments as if using coins. 
10.2 DigiCash 
DigiCash was founded in 1990 by D. Chaum to provide a secure electronic 
payment mechanisms based on public key cryptography he developed. DigiCash 
uses electronic cash as the payment method, and uses software implementation 
called ecash, instead of storing the cash in a tamper-resistant chip [AD . 
"Ecash" can perform transaction between the bank and the user or between 
two end users like paper cash. Using "ecash", a user can withdraw electronic 
cash from the bank and store in his local computer. He can then spend these 
cash without the need to open an account at the shop or to transmit his credit 
card number over the Internet. Moreover, just like paper cash, the identity of 
the payer is anonymous and it is based on the concept of blind signatures [43；. 
1. Electronic Cash Withdrawal - The user A'<s computer creates the cash 
sealed with a digital envelop and transfers to the bank. Then the bank 
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(a) 1. Sealed Cash ( ‘ 
UserA A'sBank 
. 2. Returned Cash with J 
an embossed Stamp 
(b) 2. Deposit the Ecash 
Payer ^ Payee Payee'sBank 
. V J 
1. Payment from the Payer 3. Withdraw the Ecash 
Figure 10.2: Simple Ecash Payment Methods 
debits A'5 account and adds a validating stamp on the envelop and returns 
it to A^s computer. (Figure 10.2a) 
2. Purchase - After the consumer has made the selection, he transfers the 
cash to the merchant. The merchant extracts the cash and forwards to 
the consumer's bank. When the merchant received the validation, he sends 
the goods or services to the consumer with a receipt. 
3. Person to Person Cash - When the payee received the cash from the payer, 
he deposits the cash to the bank. Then he withdraws the cash just de-
posited after the cash is validated from the payer's bank. (Figure 10.2b) 
10.3 The Financial Services Technology Con-
sortium 
The Financial Services Technology Consortium (FSTC) is a consortium of fi-
nancial services providers, national laboratories, universities, and government 
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Figure 10.3: FSTC Electronic Check Protocol 
agencies who carry out researches and develop interbank technical projects [AE • 
10.3.1 Electronic Check Project 
The FSTC Electronic Check Project models traditional paper check by 
their Electronic Check [AF]. Under their project, (i) paper checkbooks will be 
replaced by Electronic Checkbooks, (ii) pens by signature cards, (iii) signatures 
by digital signatures and (iv) oridinary mail by e-mail over public network like 
Internet. The Electronic Check protocol can be simplified as Figure 10.3. 
FSTC Electronic Check Component 
1. Electronic Check and Checkbook - The Electronic Check consists of 
ascii text block signed by Electronic Checkbook using public key crypto-
graphic signatures. Some possible implementations of Electronic Check-
book include (i) a tamper-resistant PCMCIA card with a mechanism to 
generate and store unique check identifiers, maintain a check register and 
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to calculate and verify digital signatures and certificates, (ii) an ISO format 
smart card. 
2. Digital Signatures - They are generated by the signer's private key in 
the public key cryptosystem, and used to sign the check. The check can 
then be verified by the signer's public key. In order to make the verifier to 
trust the public key of the signer, the signer can sign the check along with 
a a letter of reference (cryptographic certificate) indicating the signer's 
name, account number and the signer's public key signed by the signer's 
bank. In second level, another "letter of reference，，is used to indicate the 
bank's name, details and public key signed by some authority. The verifier 
can use the public key of the authority to verfiy the bank's and the account 
certificate and hence verify the signature of the Electronic Check. 
3. Tamper-resistant Signature Cards - They are used to generate the 
digital signatures without disclosing the signer's private key. This private 
key is stored in the processor and the memory on the signature card and 
cannot be access through the card's connector. 
FSTC Electronic Check Technology 
1. Authentication of Electronic Checks - As stated before, the checks 
and the checkbooks can be authenticated by public key certificates. 
2. Fraud Prevention - Digital signature keys are stored in secure signature 
card to prevent forgery. Hashing function and digital signature are used 
together to prevent message alternation. 
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3. Duplication Prevention - Duplication is prevented by means of times-
tamps. Both the Electronic Checks and Electronic Check certificates will 
expire to prevent them from reuse. The issue bank will also keep track of 
Electronic Checks which have been presented. 
4. Fraud Deposition Prevention - The Electronic Check can be encrypted 
by the intended payee's public key to prevent fraud deposition of the check. 
10,3.2 Electronic Commerce Project 
FSTC Electronic Commerce Project's aim is to design an infrastructure to sup-
port secure and reliable electronic commerce and financial transactions via the 
existing banking system. The payment model is planned to support other pay-
ment mechanisms like FSTC Electronic Cheque and SmartCard based electronic 
cash [AH . 
The payment model can be described by Figure 10.4. Payment instruc-
tions are processed by the banks' EPH {Electronic Payments Handler), the EPH 
passes the instructions in appropriate format to a payment processing system. 
The EPH also receives responses includes: (i) credit card authorization, (ii) 
money transfer debit advice and (iii) ACH {Automated Clearing House) file ac-
ceptance or rejection, and forward to the orignator. The EPH consists of four 
main components: 
1. E P H Frontend - enforces security for messages to and from the Internet 
and protected others EPH compoents from the Internet. 
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Figure 10.4: FSTC Electronic Commerce Infrastructure 
2. EPH Server - handles payments protocol, selection of payments mecha-
nisms includes: (i) credit card payments, (ii) ACH, (iii) money transfer, 
(iv) ATM-like mechanism and (v) EPH-to-EPH clearing mechanism, and 
interfaces with other payment systems. 
3. EPH Certification Server - for issuance, validation, revocation of bank 
cerficates and maintenance of Certificate Revocation Lists. 
4. EPH Payment Server - supports EPH-to-EPH communication and 
other payments services. 
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10.4 FirstVirtual 
First Virtual is a payment system based on credit-debit model incorporated 
in March 1994 and founded by L. Stein, T. Khoury, E. StefFemd, N. Borenstein 
and M. Rose, they launched the Internet Payment System in October, 1994. 
The First Virtual system does not use encryption and instead of sending the 
credit card number over the Internet, the users use account identifiers called 
VirtualPIN to make purchase. Consumers' credit card number and merchants' 
bank account information will be sent to First Virtual when first signup over a 
private telephone line and by postal mail respectively and all these information 
are kept on a secure computer which is not on the Internet [AI . 
A VirtualPIN is an alphanumeric character string acts as an alias of financial 
information or credit card. It identifies the users' and banks' accounts and 
it is linked to users' financial information off the Internet. First Virtual uses 
VirtualPIN to provide a secure link between the Internet and the credit cards, 
banks. 
Buying and selling transactions are processed on the Internet whereas bank-
ing transaction and financial operations are processed offline. To purchase, the 
consumer sends his VirtualPIN to the merchant off the Internet. The merchant 
forwards the VirtualPIN to First Virtual and request to charge the consumer's 
credit card. First Virtual then asks the consumer for purchase confirmation 
through e-mail and charges the consumer only when he confirms the transaction 
by e-mail via a separate, secure line which is not accessible from the Internet. 
First Virtual claims that the key authentication mechanism relys on the 
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buyer's e-mail based confirmation of each purchase. If someone tries to use the 
VirtualPIN to purchase without authorization, the user can inform First Virtual 
when he received the e-mail for charge confirmation, and the stolen VirtualPIN 
would be inactivated immediately. To defeat this mechanism, an attacker needs 
the knowledge of the VirtualPIN, user's e-mail address and the contents of the 
e-mail which is very unlikely. 
First Virtual thinks that using encryption and digital signature will make 
the system complicated and difficult to use. They suggest that encryption and 
signature technologies require the use of software and certification infrastructure 
that are not commonly available and some algorithms are restricted by patents， 
copyrights and export rules. 
10.5 Mondex 
The initial concept of Mondex was first invented at NatWest (National Westmin-
ster Bank) by T. Jones and G. Higgins in March 1990 and the first patents were 
applied for in April same year. In 1993, Midland Bank has joined them to be the 
main partner in UK. In October 1994, they get franchise from Hongkong Bank 
in the Far East including Hong Kong, China, Singapore and so on. Moreover, 
the first Mondex service was launched in Swindon, UK in July 1995 [AJ . 
Mondex claims that Mondex is electronic cash on a card. They use a smart 
card to store electronic cash on an encrypted microchip. The card can be used 
for payment just like using cash and no authorization or signature is required. 
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They said that the electronic locking system makes it more secure that cash. 
The smart card provide protection against software or physical attack and re-
engineering. Moreover, the chip in Mondex card can generate a unique digital 
signature which can be recognised by other Mondex card during transaction. 
This unique signature guarantees the identity of the card and the data transfer 
is unmodified. 
Mondex - Paying on the Internet 
According to Mondex, the security depends on the chip on the card but not the 
network, so money can be transfered over Internet. A Mondex card can handle 
five different currencies at any time, so an Internet user can make transaction 
using the currency familiar over the world. The Mondex transaction includes 
[AK]: 
1. Select the goods or services from the merchants that accepts Mondex. 
2. Insert the Mondex card into a card reader connected to the computer upon 
completion of selection. 
3. Validate another end of the link and transferred from the card to the 
merchant's device. 
4. Receive the services or goods. 
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Mondex Devices 
1. Mondex card - it is an integrated circuit (IC) card, i.e. a plastic card with 
a small microcomputer chip embedded in it [AL]. This microcomputer was 
programmed to function as an electronic purse which can be loaded with 
value and stored until payment. The balance on the card can be checked 
by a balance reader. 
2. Mondex wallet - it is a pocket-sized device with a keyboard and a screen, 
it enables the cardholder to store the value separately and carry less cash 
on the card. Hence the lost can be minimize even if the card is lost [AL . 
3. Mondex telephone - it can acts as a personal ATM which allows direct 
access to a bank account [AL]. A Mondex cardholder can transfer money 
through a telephone line to other cardholders over the world. 
10.6 NetBill 
The NetBill project is developed by CMU's (Carnegie Mellon University) Infor-
mation Networking Institute. The aim of the project is to design protocols and 
software of Internet commerce. NetBill acts as a third party for authentication, 
account management, transaction and billing processing [AM . 
The NetBill server maintains both the consumers' and the merchants' ac-
counts and linked to conventional financial institutions. A NetBill transaction 
includes the transfer of information goods, credits and debits of the merchant's 
and consumer's account respectively [AN]. Moreover, there are client library 
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Figme 10.5: NetBill Architecture and Transaction Protocol 
called the CheckBook and the server library called the Till which manage all 
security and payment protocols, relieving the client and server application. All 
information exchange between the Checkbook and the Till are encrypted to 
protect against adversaries. 
The NetBill Transaction Protocol can be divided into 8 steps, 
1. The consumer requests a price quote through W W W browsers and indi-
cates the Checkbook library. The Checkbook library sends an authenti-
cated request to the Till library and forwards to the merchants' application. 
2. The merchant returns the price quote to the consumer's application via 
the Till and the Checkbook. 
3. If the consumer accepts the price quote, the Checkbook then sends a pur-
chase request to the merchant's Till. 
4. The Till requests the information from the merchant's application. The 
information is encrypted by one-time key with the cryptographic checksum 
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computed on them (like MD5) and send to the consumer's Checkbook. 
5. The Checkbook computes its checksum on the encrypted message upon 
completion of information transfer. The message is digitally signed as the 
electronic payment order (EPO) which indicating the product identifier, 
the price, checksum and a time-out stamp and send to the Till. 
6. The Till compare the checksum of the EPO with its checksum. If they 
match, the merchant's application appends the decryption key to the EPO 
and digitally signs the whole message and sends to the NetBill server. 
7. The NetBill server verifies the consumer and merchant signatures. If they 
are valid and the consumer has enough funds in his account, the NetBill 
server will debit the consumer account and credit the merchant account, 
log the transaction and make a copy of the decryption key and returns the 
merchant a digitally signed receipt. 
8. The merchant's application forwards this NetBill server's receipt to the 
Checkbook and complete the transaction. 
10.7 NetCash 
NetCash is a real-time anonymous electronic payment system on the Internet 
developed at the Information Sciences Institute of the University (ISI) of the 
University of Southern California (USC). According to NetCash, the proper-
ties of NetCash framework include security, anonymity, scalability, acceptabil-
ity and interoperability. NetCash uses independently managed and distributed 
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Figure 10.6: An Accounting Heirarchy 
currency servers (CS) to allow exchange between electronic cash and other 
non-anonymous instruments like electronic checks. The users can select the 
level of anonymity from non-anonymous and weakly anonymous instruments to 
unconditionally anonymity proposed by D. Chaum [AO, 44, 46 • 
To setup a currency server, insurance for the new currency is obtained from 
an insuring agency similar to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the cur-
rency is backed by the account balance registered to the CS. The CS obtains 
certificate of insurance to manage the currency from the insuring agency. An 
sample accounting heirarchy is shown in Figure 10.6, the account servers (AS) 
maintain accounts for the currency servers and other clients. The CS provides 
services like: (i) electronic cash verification, (ii) untraceable cash exchange, (iii) 
using checks to purchase cash and (iv) cashing in cash for checks. 
The electronic cash used by NetCash includes a serial number signed with 
the CS's private key I<cl as a unique identifier. The CS maintains a list of 
serial number of all outstanding cash and checks the cash validity based on the 
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I BN， cs B'S public key 
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S_id Service identifier 
T_id Unique identifier 
Figure 10.7: NetCash Monentary Transactions Protocol 
serial number. A simple NetCash protocol that protects the payee from double 
spending is shown in Figure 10.7. 
1. The anonymous payer A sends B the cash, service identifier and two keys 
SI<AN and I<AN all encrypted by the payee B's public key Ks. 
2. B forwards the received cash to the CS with a newly generated secret key 
SI<BN and the transaction to be performed (a new cash or cheque) and 
all encrypted by CS's public key. 
3. The CS verifys the received cash by checking the serial number against the 
outstanding list. If the serial number is found, the cash is said valid and 
not been spent before, then CS sends B the requested instrument (cash or 
cheque) encrypted by SI<BN. 
4. B returns a receipt to A which includes the amount paid, a unique identifier 
T,d and date signed by his private key K^^ and encrypted by A's secret 
key SKAN- Tid is used with the session key I<AN to obtain the service. 
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10.8 NetCheque 
NetCheque is another electronic payment system developed at the Information 
Sciences Institute of the University of Southern California. Users of NetCheque 
can write electronic checks and spend through e-mail or other network protocols. 
Signatures are authenticated by Kerberos where reliability and scalability are 
provided by multiple accounting servers [AP, 45’ 46 . 
NetCheque is a distributed accounting service supporting the credit-debit 
model. It works like a conventional current account, the account holders digi-
tally sign electronic cheques that include the names of the payer, payee and the 
finanical institution, the payer's account identifier and the amount. Signed and 
endorsed cheques are exchanged between accounting servers to settle accounts 
as shown in Figure 10.6. NetCheque is well suited for frequent micropayment 
for some commerce, and the performance is obtained through the use of con-
ventional cryptography. NetCheque claims that its use of conventional cryp-
tography makes it faster than systems based on the public key cryptography. 
Combined with NetCash, the service providers and the users can select different 
mechanisms based on the level of anonymity requested. NetCash can also use 
NetCheque to clear payments between currency servers. 
NetCheque system uses Kerberosfor authentication, the digital signature for 
signing or endorsing a cheque is a Kerberos ticket called a proxy which based 
on private key cryptography. The information in the cheque includes, (i) the 
amount of the cheque, (ii) the currency unit, (iii) the expired date, (iv) the 
charged account, (v) the payee(s) and (vi) the signatures and endorsements 
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verifiable by the accounting server. 
When a user signs a cheque, he calls the write—cheque function to generate 
the cheque's cleartext portion (the account, payee, amount and currency unit). 
Then a Kerberos ticket is obtained for user authentication of accounting server, 
generation of checksum for the cheque and to append the ticket and the authen-
ticator to the cheque. Finally, the cheque is base 64 encoded and sent to the 
payee through e-mail or realtime on-line service. 
To deposit the cheque, the deposit_cheque function is called to read the clear-
text part of the cheque, obtains a Kerberos ticket, generates an authenticator 
to endorse the cheque and appends the endorsement to the cheque. Finally, the 
endorsed cheque is deposited through an encrypted connection to the payee's 
account. The authorized users can request for his account balance and other 
account information through the statement function. It will open an encrypted 





In the second part of the thesis, some security issues in Internet are discussed. In 
the 90s’，the growth of Internet is substantial and now a wide variety of services 
are available like e-mail, FTP, gopher, TELNET. Moreover, the popularity of 
World Wide Web provides a better interface betwen the users and the Internet, 
now the users can access text, audio, image and video information over the 
Internet. This characteristic provides a new media for business and commerce. 
However, the openness of Internet also makes Internet vulnerable and security 
problems will become a great concern for people or companies who want to use 
Internet for electronic commerce. 
Nowadays, many cryptographic algorithms and software packages are avail-
able for Internet security. However, the difficulty to imderstand these algorithms 
may become a barrier for those who want to use them. So the background 
knowledge and mathematics behind these security systems are first introduced. 
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In fact, many security systems rely on one or many private key and public key 
cryptosystems. A brief introduction to some popular private key (DES, IDEA, 
RC5) and public key (Diffle-Hellman, RSA and ellptic curves) cryptosystems are 
given. 
Moreover, authentication is also important in Internet, digital signature 
based on public key is used to solved authenication problems. Hashing func-
tion is usually employed together to provide message digest and integrity check. 
Current digital signature schemes include DSS and Elgamal signature scheme 
and common hasing functions include MD2 and MD5 are introduced. Some se-
curity softwares for Internet like Kerberos, PEM and PGP which based on these 
algorithms are also discussed. 
Having explained the basic building block of an Internet security system, 
we can now combine them together to construct the infrastructure of electronic 
commerce system in Internet. The first thing that the consumers can interact 
with the merchants maybe the Internet browsers. The web browsers provide 
the user interface for the users to select goods, services and obtain informa-
tion from the merchants. Meanwhile, the users can send their feedbacks and 
purchase orders over the Internet to the merchants. The second thing, the pro-
cesses of payment methods including credit card, electronic cash and electronic 
cheque are presented. The last thing introduced is some commercial systems 
for electronic commerce like CyberCash, DigiCash, FirstVirtual, FSTC Project, 
Mondex, NetBill, NetCash and NetCheque. Each system may use different pay-
ment mechanisms and architectures and they are briefly described. 
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紛紛上網，而一間間的 I n t e r n e t Service P r o v i d e r亦投入市場。一般來説，最常用的月良 
I 務都可算是W o r l d - W i d e Web ( W W W ) ,要閲覽W W W上的寅料，用戶需要一個劉覽器 
(browser) o 而在芸芸的劉覽器之中，栢信最被廣泛使用的都可算是 N e t s c a p e (網景）。 
I 你有否利用過 I n t e r n e t 去傳遞一些寅料璧如是電話、地址甚至是信用卡密碼？如果有的話 
I ，你又有否擔心過這些寅料會被第三者知道甚至是更改呢？因為 I n t e r n e t 是由世界各地 
I 的網絡聯結而成的，所以寅料的傳送往往會經過很多不同的國家和不同的網絡，因此 
I n t e r n e t需要一個十分安全的系統去提供賈料保密（D a t a 3600^:117)。此類系統首先將寅 
W A S ( E n c r y p t i o n ) ,印是將賞料轉成一些不能被第三者明白的形式；至於彳！入密的實料 
還原的歩驟則叫解密（ D e c r y p t i o n ) � 而以 N e t : s c a p e 為例，它所採用的保安系統主夢由 
RSA Data S e c u r i t y , l n c .所提供。或者你會覺得這些系統的原纟里一定十分複雜，要涉及很 
高深的數學運算；事寅上，它最基本的原理之一就是小學學過之輾轉相除法。本文將會菖 
試說明在 i n t e r n e t 的保安系統背後一些簡單的原理。 
首先介紹的是輾轉栢除法（2^0113630 Algorithm) t 這是用於計算兩個整數之間的最大 
公約教（0�6&163七Common Divisor - GCD)�此外亦可以用作解整數方程ax + by = 
g c d ( a , b ) � 例 如 要 求 1 4 4 和 4 2 之 間 的 最 大 公 約 教 ， 
3 ) 144 I 42 ( 2 
] 4 2 X 3 = 126 I 1 8 X 2 = 3 6 
3 ) 18 I 6 
6 X 3 = 1 8 I 
0 
所以 gcd(144,42) = 6。 
輾轉栢除法有許多應用，包括（ 1 )解孫子點兵法，（ 2 )解射鵰英雄傳中琪站之第三道難題 
及（ 3 )萬聯網上實料保密。首先講的是孫子點兵法（C t i i n e s e Remainder Theo rem ) ,由中國 
著名的古代兵法家孫子用於點算軍中士兵的教目。這問題亦可寫成：求 X 解方程組， 
X 除 p l 鮮 a l X 三 a l (mod p l ) 
X 除 p2 餘 a2 或 X = a2 (mod p2) 
X 除 p3 n a3 X = a3 (mod p3) 一 主、 










月，餘百零五便得知。」“ < 金 庸 - 射 鵰 英 雄 傳 > (註） 
這逭問題可用以下的方程組代表： 
. X 除 3 餘 2 , X 除 5 m 3 , X 除 7 餘 2 
用孫子點兵法解此方程組可得， 
X ^ 余（3X5X7)_ 70a + 21b + 15c 
或 X 除 105 餘 140 + 63 + 30 
或 X 除 1 0 5 餘 2 3 
再舉一例，現假設有以下一方程組， 
X艮余 2餘 1 , X 除 5 餘 4 , X 除 9 餘 5 
再使用孫子點兵法解此方程組可得， 
X 除（ 2 乂 5 \ 9 )餘 45a + 3 6b + 10c 
或 X 除 90 餘 45 + 144 + 50 
或 X 除 9 0 餘 5 9 
筆者亦菖試作了一首打油詩。「雙龍拱照九五尊，五行幻變六六順，九星聯珠方十日， 
九旬盡去謎揭忠。」 
以上這些定理現在都已被廣泛利用在各種不同的 I n t e r n e t 保安系統之上。 
前面曾提及過 N e t s c a p e 所使用的保安系統是由 R S A Data Security 111<::.所提供的0 
其中的 R S A 系統是由美國的麻省理工消 1 7 )的 R o n Rivest, Adi Shamir和Leonard 
Adleman於1978年最先提出的。這是現時其中一丨固最可靠的公開 i盒密碼系統（Publ i c Key 
cryptosystem) o 公間錯密碼系統不同於傳統的（秘密錯？ 1 土 7 3 1 3 仄 6 7 )密碼系統。使用 
傳統的密碼系統就好像我們日常使用的錯匙（乂37)，我們用相同的錯匙來上镇（入密）和閩鎖 
(解密）。假設A想將一明文（？1 & 1 1 1 1 6乂1:)傳送給B，A便使用秘密鍾將明文入密以得出 
密文（01口&6^ 6乂"。當3收到密文之後，他必須使用栢同的秘密錯將密，1密。因此3 
必須預先將秘密錯傳送給A，但若果在傳送過程被第三君知》的話，那麼這第三者便可將 
A 傳送給 B 的密文解密，這便是密錯的分配問題。除此之外，秘密錯密碼系統亦難以用於 
確認用户的身份。 
公間_盒密碼系統便可解決這些問題，使用公間_盒密碼系統，每丨固用户都有一組公間錯 
( P u b l i c K e y )和一組秘密錯（P r i v a t e K e y ) 。公間錯只是用作上 !貞（入密），而秘密錯只 
是用作闆镇（解密）。用户會將公閩錄公間給其他用戶査看，而自己則將秘密縫保密，因此 
第三者便不能進行解密，此外公間錄的設計亦會令第三者極難（幾乎不可能）由公開錯求出 
^ i ^ � 假 設 A 想 將 一 明 文 傳 送 給 B ， A 便 使 用 B 的 公 間 鍾 將 明 文 入 密 以 得 出 密 文 。 
當 B 收到密文之後，他便使用自己的秘密錯將密文解密。 
R S A 的 闲 個 公 間 錯 的 産 生 過 程 如 下 ： 選 擇 闲 個 質 數 P 和 q ， 設 P = 3 fe q = 5。 
計 算 n = p X q = 1 5 。 隨 機 選 擇 一 個 入 密 密 錯 e 令 g c d ( e , { p - l ) X ( q - l ) ) = 1 ° 現 選 
e = 1 1 ,這樣這系統的闲個公開密錯便是 n = 1 5 和 e = 1 1。跟著使用輾轉栢除法去求 
解 密 ！ 盒 d 使 滿 足 e X d 除 8 餘 1 ； 得 出 d = 3。 
跟 荖 & 3 & 的 入 密 過 程 如 下 ： 設 明 文 M 為 7 , 那 麼 密 文 C 即 為 M - e (mod n) = 7^11 
(mod 15) = 1 3 � 而 解 密 的 過 程 是 ： 明 文 M 是 CAd (mod n) = 13^3 (mod 15) = 2197 
{mod 15) = 7 � 再 舉 一 例 ： 設 明 文 M 為 3 , 那 麼 密 文 C = 3 -11 (mod 15) = 1 2 � 再 使 
用 d 解密得 M = 12^ 3 (mod 15) = 1728 (mod 15) = 3 � 
R S A 的原理是：如 n = pXq» m = (p-l) X (q-l) » 而 k 是 m 的 倍 教 。 那 麼 對 任 意 一 
個數字 M, M-(k+l)除 n 餘 M � 例如 n = 2X5 二 10，m = 4» k : 8。若 M = 3 ,那麼 
3-(8 + l) = 19683 » 除 10 便餘 3 = M 。 又 例 如 n = 3 X 7 = 2 1 , m = 1 2 , k = 1 2 。 若 
M = 2 , 那 麼 2-(12 + l) = 8192,除 21 便餘 2 = M � 在 RSA 裡 ， e X d 除 m 餘 1 ， 所 
以 e X d = k+l (k 是 m 的倍數）。因此解密時， C - d (mod n) = ( L T e ^ d (mod n ) = 
MA(eXd) (mod n) = M^ (k+l) (mod n) = Mo 
以上所提及過的例子所用的數字都是比校細的，但是在寅際用途上這些數宇都是十分大 
。因為破解R S A的最明顯方法是分解（ [ & 0 = 0 1 1 2 6 ) n ， n 被 分 解 之 後 便 可 知 P 和 q ， 跟 
著 解 密 錯 d 亦 可 被 計 算 出 來 。 所 以 如 果 n 越 大 的 話 》 代 表 n 越 難 被 分 解 ， 一 般 來 說 ， 
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